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ABSTRACT  
 
Wolfram, Sophie, M.S., Spring 2017                Environmental Studies 
 
Recognition, Participation, and Distributive Justice: Community-Based Environmental Problem-
Solving in Southeast San Francisco and Imperial County, California 
Chairperson: Neva Hassanein  
 
An extensive body of environmental justice literature has demonstrated repeatedly what 
impacted communities have long known from experience, that environmental pollution including 
groundwater threats, diesel particulate matter, toxic releases, pesticide use, and hazardous waste 
sites, disproportionately burdens people of color and low-income communities. The 
environmental justice movement seeks to bring about equal protection of all people from 
environmental hazards, including equal enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. 
Advocacy within the movement has frequently adopted oppositional framings with respect to the 
state; however, collaborative approaches to environmental justice problem-solving have become 
more common, especially as states increasingly recognize environmental justice in policy. This 
thesis investigates a California community-based environmental reporting network called 
Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN) through interviews and participant 
observation in two sites: the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood of San Francisco, and the 
Imperial Valley in Southern California. The paper argues that IVAN functions to build 
relationships and trust between community members and government bodies, impose 
accountability on regulatory agencies, foster social learning that benefits all stakeholders, and 
solve pollution problems that affect public health, quality of life, and the physical environment. 
By creating and sustaining a forum that addresses community concerns related to the 
environment, IVAN acknowledges the validity of residents’ experiences, invites meaningful 
participation in the process of enforcement of environmental regulations, and, to a limited 
degree, reduces the pollution burden in low-income communities of color. I argue that in this 
way, IVAN’s collaborative approach to problem-solving is effective in bridging multiple 
dimensions of environmental justice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
I was a victim of pesticide poisoning my first days in Imperial County. That's why I live 
out in Ocotillo, because I had to escape. I could not live in a place where I was getting 
sick from pesticides. It really scares me what people there in the county are being 
exposed to. There’s no justification for some of this stuff. 
 
-Edie, Imperial Valley resident 
 
 The first time I met Edie, we were seated on opposite ends of a conference room 
table under the fluorescent lights of a meeting room in the El Centro branch of the 
California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC). Like so many of the people 
I spoke with as this project developed, Edie’s primary concern with regards to 
environmental health is not for herself; she worries mostly about those who are more 
vulnerable than herself, and she works doggedly to improve environmental conditions for 
them. That day, in November 2016, we were participating in a monthly meeting of the 
Imperial Valley Environmental Justice Task Force, and we were joined by representatives 
of federal, state, and regional government bodies; staff members from a community-
based organization located in Brawley, California; and Ray, a resident of Mexicali, 
Mexico. Over the course of two hours, I listened as the group discussed a series of reports 
residents of the Imperial Valley – a border region of California one hundred miles or so 
east of San Diego and sixty miles west of Yuma, Arizona – had filed online through a 
website called IVAN.  
 The Task Force brainstormed better ways to apply gypsum to agricultural fields 
so that nearby communities would not be affected by fine particulates, they clarified the 
jurisdictions of the Air Pollution Control District (APCD) versus the state Air Resources 
Board (CARB), and they discussed the increased incidence of valley fever in the region, 
which Edie suggested might be attributable to the amount of desert land being disturbed 
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to install utility-scale solar arrays to meet California’s aggressive mandate of 50 percent 
renewable energy by 2030. They discussed illegal dumping by contractors who come to 
the desert to avoid disposal fees as they off-load construction equipment and lab waste 
(including explosives such as picric acid), and they talked about the challenges of local 
politics and the lack of participation of county officials in Task Force meetings. After the 
meeting, Edie and Ray shared their phone numbers and email addresses with me and 
invited me to join members of the Task Force for dinner across the street. 
⸎   ⸎   ⸎ 
 The burdens of environmental pollution are not shared evenly across the 
population, and all people do not have equal access to the decision-making processes that 
result in the uneven distribution of hazards. In California, a state with one of the most 
extensive environmental regulatory apparatuses in the nation, the correlation between 
exposure to pollution and population characteristics such as race and income level 
remains pronounced (Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 2017). This 
paper tells the story of a program operating in low-income communities of color across 
California that is attempting to affect systemic change in how environmental protection 
works and in who benefits from the operations of the state regulatory apparatus. The 
Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN) program is a community-based 
environmental reporting network that works like a one-stop shop for residents who want 
to report anything from an acrid odor coming from an industrial facility to trash heaps in 
an alleyway to diesel trucks idling in front of their homes or schools. When community 
members witness any incident in their community that affects their health, quality of life, 
or harms the environment where they live, they can report to IVAN, a program run by the 
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community with participation from local, state, regional, and federal government bodies. 
IVAN includes a Task Force that meets each month to discuss the reports filed and the 
follow-up, if any, from agencies.  
 I examine the structure and the function of IVAN through two case studies 
selected from the program’s seven locations: the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood in 
San Francisco, and the Imperial Valley. I argue that in those sites, IVAN functions as a 
unique forum for sustained communication among area residents, government agency 
staff, and community-based organizations. Whereas environmental protection is typically 
fragmented among many government entities with very specific jurisdictions, and public 
participation in environmental decision-making is usually limited to engagement on 
discrete issues at particular moments in time, IVAN is designed to involve the 
community itself on an ongoing basis. The program organically integrates many facets of 
environmental protection into a forum designed by and controlled by communities 
impacted by the pollution the program addresses. This comprehensive, community-based 
approach to environmental protection, I argue, creates the potential for IVAN to function 
as a place for residents to experience recognition of the validity of their concerns, 
participate meaningfully in problem-solving, and experience improvements in 
environmental quality as a result.  
 In the background section that follows, I describe the history of IVAN in 
California and show how residents, community-based organizations, and government 
agency staff interact with the program. The section concludes with an overview of the 
environmental hazards the populations of IVAN’s seven regions encounter. The literature 
review explores the historical origins and theoretical dimensions of environmental 
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justice. It provides an overview of the environmental enforcement apparatus in the United 
States and in California and makes the case that low-income communities of color 
experience weaker enforcement of environmental regulations than less socially 
vulnerable populations do. The final section of the literature review frames the work 
IVAN does by addressing the benefits and challenges of lay participation in 
environmental decision-making and of collaborative versus oppositional approaches to 
environmental justice advocacy. The methods section describes how and why I chose the 
two case study sites for this project; the process of gathering data through semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation, and document review; limitations of the methods, and 
the methods used for data analysis. In the discussion section, I share key findings related 
to IVAN’s function in both Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley and draw 
connections between the role the program plays and theoretical dimensions of 
environmental justice. The conclusion offers a final synthesis of the findings and offers 
directions for future research. 
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IVAN: HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND GEOGRAPHY 
 In the 2008 Enforcement Report of the California Department of Toxic Substances 
Control (DTSC), its Acting Director acknowledged that communities facing environmental 
injustice had long demanded “transparency and regular communication about what’s being done 
to keep them safe from toxic dangers” (DTSC 2008: 3). In response to that ongoing pressure, in 
2007 DTSC began its Environmental Justice Enforcement Initiative, a key component of which 
were day-long tours of sites local residents suspected to be hazardous to the environment and to 
public health (DTSC 2008). After each bus tour, community residents, activists, and government 
staff attended workshops to discuss what they had seen that day and collectively “set strategy 
and priorities for enforcement efforts in true democratic style” (DTSC 2008: 12). Despite 
DTSC’s attempts to engage meaningfully with communities, however, many activists and some 
DTSC staff members felt that the Environmental Justice Enforcement Initiative did not go far 
enough to develop ongoing dialogue with those most burdened by multiple sources of pollution 
(Jatkar and London 2015).  
 Among those who remained concerned that the severity of the problems facing 
California’s poor communities of color warranted more than a one-off bus tour and a check-in 
with the community after 100 days were then-DTSC enforcement staff member Ryan Atencio 
and Luis Olmedo. Olmedo is the Executive Director of Comité Cívico Del Valle (CCDV), an 
organization focused on environmental justice, health services, and community services 
programs in Imperial County (Comité Cívico Del Valle 2016). Atencio successfully appealed to 
DTSC for more staff time to be allotted to department collaboration with community 
environmental justice organizations, and in 2009, DTSC and CCDV, along with other 
community-based organizations, established the Imperial County Environmental Justice Task 
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Force (Jatkar and London 2015). At monthly Task Force meetings, residents reported 
environmental problems facing their communities. Atencio made sure that the reports reached 
the appropriate agencies, and he also began mapping where violations were occurring. The 
program eventually changed its name to Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods 
(IVAN). IVAN’s intent is to improve health outcomes, increase visibility of environmental 
problems in the communities where it works, and facilitate greater transparency and 
accountability in public agency responses to reports of environmental violations (Jatkar and 
London 2015). 
 Today, IVAN is active in seven sites across California: Imperial, Kern, Fresno, and Kings 
counties; Eastern Coachella Valley (a section of Riverside County); and the Wilmington and 
Bayview Hunters Point neighborhoods in Los Angeles and San Francisco, respectively. At the 
heart of each IVAN site are an online system and an Environmental Justice Task Force. The 
online system allows residents to report potential environmental violations using their computer 
or phone. The IVAN website and application allow residents to type a description and post 
photos and/or videos documenting the problem about which they are filing their report. For 
example, if a resident were to report illegal dumping, he or she would write a brief note about 
what how much trash has been dumped and where, and might also upload a photo or video 
documenting details of the site. In addition, residents can indicate the geographic location of the 
subject of their report both by typing the approximate address and also by dropping a pin using a 
feature enabled by Google Maps (IVAN 2016). Those without access to the technology needed 
to submit a report online can attend the monthly IVAN Task Force meetings that take place in 
each IVAN site. 
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 The IVAN Task Force meetings are co-convened by public agency staff and non-profit 
organizations. They are open to the public and are attended by community members, government 
agency staff, and community-based organizations. At the Task Force meetings, participants 
discuss the reports filed online during the preceding month; any participant is free to share 
technical expertise, firsthand knowledge about the report, questions, or concerns. At many 
meetings, a government agency delivers a presentation about an issue relevant to the community. 
In each region, one person, usually a government agency employee, takes the role of problem-
solver. The problem-solver is responsible for checking the online reporting system and ensuring 
that a staff member at the relevant agencies receive and address the complaint. Not every 
complaint is a violation, so addressing the complaint does not always mean launching an 
investigation or taking enforcement action. As I describe in the Discussion section of this paper, 
there is significant variation between the structure and function of the Task Forces in the two 
regions investigated in this study. In all regions, however, the Task Force is a forum where 
anyone can bring health and quality of life concerns to the attention of residents of the region, 
government agencies, and community-based organizations.  
 In California, rural inland valleys that are home to largely low-income populations with a 
high percentage of Latino residents endure the greatest proportion of environmental health 
hazards and are the most socially vulnerable (Office of Environmental Health Hazard 
Assessment 2016). For instance, the San Joaquin Valley comprises the southern half of 
California’s Central Valley. It includes Kings, Merced, Fresno, and Kern counties; IVAN 
operates in all but Merced. The Valley is known for its enormous agricultural productivity, but 
residents in the region also face environmental health hazards, including severe air pollution, 
unsafe drinking water, poor infrastructure, and a disproportionate share of California’s toxic 
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waste sites (CRPE 2011). The sources of pollution in the Valley include nitrates from synthetic 
fertilizers and pesticides that have degraded the quality of groundwater; particulate matter and 
smog from mega-dairies; oil refineries; and diesel trucks and other vehicles on Interstate-5. 
Poverty and a lack of public participation compound the problem of environmental pollution 
(CRPE 2011). Many residents depend on very low-wage jobs in polluting industries, and the 
political process often remains inaccessible to the residents who do not have access to the 
internet to receive notification of public meetings; who lack transportation to the county seat or 
Sacramento to attend meeting; and who speak only Spanish and cannot understand the English in 
which most meetings are conducted (CRPE 2011).  
 The Eastern Coachella Valley (ECV) and the Imperial Valley, two other regions where 
IVAN operates, lie immediately north and south of the Salton Sea, respectively, in southeastern 
California. The ECV is in Riverside County, south of much more affluent Palm Springs, and the 
Imperial Valley, in Imperial County, stretches from the Salton Sea to the north to the border city 
of Calexico on its southern end. A predominantly rural and agricultural region, Imperial County 
consistently ranks within the top ten agriculturally productive counties in the nation (Imperial 
County 2014). Environmental pollution from multiple sources poses significant health risks to 
both Imperial Valley and ECV residents. Industrial agriculture contributes to water and air 
pollution; the Salton Sea, California’s largest lake, is receding and causing contaminants such as 
mercury, lead, and arsenic to become airborne; and the transportation of goods along Interstate-8 
and idling trucks at the border crossing in Calexico lead to high levels of particulate matter in the 
air (California Environmental Health Tracking Program 2015). One in five children in Imperial 
County have been diagnosed with asthma, and asthma hospitalization rates there are the highest 
in the state; the link between asthma and pollution is well-established (Bacon 2012). Meanwhile, 
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many ECV residents live in substandard housing with inadequate infrastructure, including lack 
of access to safe drinking water and failing septic systems (London et al. 2013).  
 IVAN also operates in two urban communities: Bayview Hunters Point in San Francisco 
and Wilmington in Los Angeles. Bayview Hunters Point, historically the industrial hub of the 
city, is a low-income neighborhood in the southeastern corner of San Francisco. Residents in that 
community face toxic contamination from the former PG&E Hunters Point power plant, the 
Southeast Sewage Treatment plant, pollution from diesel freight transport, two freeways, and 
over 150 brownfield sites (Greenaction 2016). Wilmington is one of several neighborhoods in 
central and southern Los Angeles that encounter “foul odors, noise and dirt from oil operations 
that are practically in their backyards” (Boxall and Mozingo 2016). A ConocoPhillips Oil 
Refinery in Wilmington poses quality-of-life challenges in the form of flaring, toxic releases, and 
particulate matter pollution (Coalition for a Safe Environment 2014).  
 In each of the seven communities where it is active, IVAN occupies a small niche in a 
long history both of environmental injustice and of advocacy to stem the tide of pollution 
adversely affecting the health and quality of life of residents. The following section explores the 
theoretical and historical context in which IVAN is situated and introduces questions about the 
efficacy of environmental justice problem-solving approaches that, as IVAN does, invite some 
measure of partnership or collaboration with government entities.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on environmental justice offers myriad examples of how low-income 
communities of color shoulder a disproportionate burden of environmental hazards while 
enjoying less than their share of benefits. In this section, I first trace the origins of the 
environmental justice movement in the United States. The next portion of the literature review 
introduces dimensions of environmental justice – distributive, procedural, and recognition justice 
– and describes the ways they intersect and interact. After providing a theoretical overview, I 
hone in on the topic of enforcement of environmental regulations and address quantitative and 
qualitative evidence of disparities in the degree to which enforcement is pursued in low-income 
communities of color compared with more affluent, predominantly white communities. The 
section concludes with a discussion of benefits and challenges of meaningful public participation 
environmental justice problem-solving. 
Launching the U.S. Environmental Justice Movement 
 In 1982, protests erupted in a predominantly African American community in Warren 
County, North Carolina, over the decision to dump over 6,000 truckloads of soils contaminated 
with polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), a highly toxic industrial chemical that was banned in the 
1970s, into a landfill in that county (Geiser and Waneck 1994). The campaign against the 
landfill, led by veterans of the civil rights movement, drew national attention to the intersecting 
issues of race, poverty, and pollution. Although communities had previously protested the siting 
of polluting facilities near where they lived, worked, and played, the protests in Warren County 
are widely recognized as marking the beginning of the environmental justice movement (Bullard 
and Johnson 2000; Sandweiss 1998).  
11 
 The protests and subsequent arrests in Warren County prompted the 1983 U.S. General 
Accounting Office study, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial 
and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities, which revealed that off-site hazardous waste 
landfills in the South were disproportionately sited in African American communities. The 
events also led the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice to produce Toxic 
Wastes and Race in the United States (1987), which found that race was the most powerful 
predictor of the location of toxic waste sites nationally (Bullard and Johnson 2000). The 
environmental justice movement soon expanded its antitoxics focus to include “public health, 
worker safety, land use, transportation, housing, resource allocation, and community 
empowerment” (Bullard and Johnson 2000: 556-7).  
 The concept of environmental racism lies at the heart of the environmental justice 
movement. We can understand environmental racism as a specific form of institutional, or 
systemic, racism. The anti-toxics movement in the late 1970s understood toxic assaults as part of 
an economic structure in which certain communities will inevitably be polluted. The civil rights 
activists who participated in the environmental justice movement recognized the unfair 
distributive outcomes of that economic structure as resulting from a social structure that isolated 
and marginalized people of color (Cole and Foster 2000). In other words, the disproportionate 
pollution burden experienced by people of color is yet another consequence of institutional 
racism; manifestations of institutional racism pertaining to environmental effects are termed 
environmental racism. Specifically, environmental racism “refers to any policy, practice, or 
directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) 
individuals, groups, or communities based on race or color” (Bullard 1990: 98). The grassroots 
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activism that has fueled the environmental justice movement represents the convergence of the 
economic analysis of the anti-toxics movement and the recognition of environmental racism.  
 While the environmental justice movement emerged in the South and shared key actors, 
an interpretive frame, and organizing tactics with the Civil Rights movement (Cole and Foster 
2000, Sandweiss 1998), it also has a distinct history in California. Many environmental justice 
activists in California can trace their activism back to involvement with the United Farm 
Workers, and the environmental justice movement remains deeply connected to the struggles of 
farmworkers for decent pay and safe working and living conditions in the state (Center on Race, 
Poverty, and the Environment 2011). Activists decry the fact that many rural, largely Hispanic 
communities across the state produce a large share of the nation’s food yet serve as a dumping 
ground for vast quantities of toxic waste (Huang and London 2012).  
 For many grassroots activists, a report published in 1984 confirmed their suspicions that 
industry and regulators were intentionally targeting low-income communities and communities 
of color when siting polluting facilities. The Cerrell Report, commissioned by the California 
Integrated Waste Management Board (now CalRecycle) to identify communities that would be 
the least likely to resist the siting of waste incinerators, recommended looking for communities 
where many residents were Catholic, had limited education and low socioeconomic status, and 
were employed in resource extractive industries (Cole and Foster 2001; CRPE 2014). In reaction, 
through community organizations and regional networks, grassroots activists in California 
address the siting of polluting facilities in vulnerable communities, the harmful effects of 
industrial agriculture, the disproportionate effect of climate change on low-income people and 
communities of color, and, through Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN), 
unequal enforcement of environmental laws and regulations (CRPE 2016). 
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 Partially in response to grassroots activism, federal and state policies have increasingly 
addressed environmental justice issues (Targ 2005). California’s state government takes a 
comprehensive approach, integrating environmental justice broadly into the work of state 
government (Targ 2005). The state’s Environmental Justice Act of 1999 defined environmental 
justice as “the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the 
development, adoption, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, 
and policies” (California Code Section 65040.12). That statute made the Office of Planning and 
Research (OPR) the coordinating agency in the California state government for all environmental 
justice programs (Office of Planning and Research 2003). OPR serves the Governor as the state’s 
comprehensive planning agency; it has a broad mandate to develop, evaluate, and update policies 
that shape statewide growth, development, and environmental quality (California Code Section 
65040).  Under the 1999 Act, the California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) is 
required to integrate environmental justice into its mission and the mission statements of its 
divisions.  
Dimensions of Environmental Justice 
 Definitions of environmental justice, including the one used by the State of California, 
often emphasize its distributive dimension, which refers to the demand for equitable distribution 
of environmental burdens and benefits (Schlosberg 2004). The early landmark reports on 
environmental justice, for example, by the U.S. General Accounting Office and the Commission 
for Racial Justice, demonstrated the disproportionate siting of hazardous waste facilities in 
minority communities (Bullard and Johnson 2000). Activists calling for environmental justice 
demand more, however, than equal distribution of harms. Questions about who gets to make 
decisions regarding issues such as the siting of hazardous waste facilities and the prioritization of 
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enforcement activities, and how those decision-making processes work, are of great concern for 
environmental justice activists (Schlosberg 2004, Shrader-Frechette 2002). In other words, 
certain power structures and processes have led to inequitable distribution in the first place, and 
environmental justice advocacy must address how environmental governance decisions are 
made. This dimension of environmental justice is called procedural justice. The third key 
dimension, in addition to distributive and procedural, is recognition justice, which refers to a 
right to recognition and respect for cultural norms and ways of knowing that differ from the 
dominant or mainstream culture (Fraser 1998).  
 The cultural injustices that deny recognition and the economic injustices that lead to 
inequitable distribution are intertwined; therefore, all three key dimensions must be in place for 
justice to be achieved (Fraser 1998; Figueroa 2004). The demand for procedural justice appears 
in the “Principles of Environmental Justice” drafted and adopted at the 1991 People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. The seventh principle states, 
“Environmental justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of 
decision-making including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and 
evaluation” (reprinted in Hofrichter 1993: 238). Procedural justice, often used interchangeably 
with the term ‘meaningful participation,’ may, under certain conditions, contribute to distributive 
justice, or the call for substantive rights (Sandweiss 1998). Meaningful public participation in 
decision-making processes can only occur when the perspectives of ethnically and culturally 
diverse groups are recognized by those in positions of power. 
 For that reason, recognition stands on its own as a critical component of environmental 
justice, acknowledging that low-income and people of color communities can experience 
meaningful participation and distributional equity only if those vested with decision-making 
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power grant those communities the same degree of respect that they offer to more affluent, white 
communities (Schlosberg 2004). In other words, they must recognize the legitimacy of the 
experiences and knowledge of less powerful communities. The politics of recognition emphasize 
the fundamental importance of making cultural perspectives socially and culturally visible and 
hold that the racism inherent in ignoring those perspectives is what allows for material inequity 
(Figueroa 2004). Furthermore, Figueroa (2004: 8) argues that according to the politics of 
recognition, deeply understanding “the complexity of cultural identity” is one route to 
“identifying and ameliorating the injustice, in this case environmental racism.” The three key 
dimensions of environmental justice represent three related lenses through which to observe and 
analyze advocacy efforts. By bringing government, residents, and community organizations 
together address environmental violations affecting community health, IVAN may offer a path to 
achieve a greater measure of procedural, recognition, and distributive justice in California 
communities that have long endured environmental injustices.   
Environmental Justice in Monitoring and Enforcement  
 As great an impact as policy development and individual siting decisions have on 
progress toward environmental justice, environmental monitoring and enforcement of existing 
laws and regulations is equally critical to ensure that unequal exposure is not exacerbated by 
unequal enforcement. Reisinger et al. (2010: 5) note that a “standard set by statute or regulation, 
if not enforced, acts merely as a recommendation.” While ample evidence supports the claim that 
people of color are disproportionately burdened by environmental pollution in the United States 
(Bullard and Johnson 2000; Cole and Foster 2001), fewer quantitative studies confirm whether 
enforcement of environmental law is delivered equitably. Although many qualitative accounts 
and case studies demonstrate enforcement disparities between low-income people of color 
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communities and more affluent, predominantly white communities, quantitative studies are less 
conclusive.   
 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) grants primacy to state 
agencies to implement and enforce many federal laws, including the Clean Air Act; the Clean 
Water Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act (FIFRA) (Gray and Shimshack 2011; Reisinger et al. 2010). The U.S. EPA and state 
agencies primarily rely on a command-and-control system of rules and deterrence to maximize 
compliance (Gunningham 2011). In recent decades, federal agencies responsible for enforcement 
have also embraced more cooperative methods such as compliance assistance, mediation and 
outreach; however, Gray and Shimshack (2011) find that despite the increasing deployment of 
these alternative methods, deterrence remains the most important factor guiding facilities’ 
compliance decisions. They suggest that because monitoring and enforcement have a more 
significant impact on environmental performance than do “corporate social responsibility, 
altruism, or nonregulatory pressures,” big increases in environmental quality might be achieved 
through “small incremental investments in monitoring and enforcement” (2011: 17). While Gray 
and Shimshack (2011) suggest that policies allocating more resources for enforcement might 
yield significant benefits, Gunningham (2011: 190) also suggests that efforts to extend the reach 
of regulators using third parties as “surrogate regulators” to monitor industry merit further study. 
 In California, the state’s Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) coordinates 
enforcement activities through its boards, departments, and offices that are responsible for 
compliance with regulating toxics, air, pesticides, water, and solid waste and recycling (CalEPA 
2014).1 In addition to its regular enforcement activities, CalEPA has established an 
                                                          
1 The California Air Resources Board and Air Districts enforce regulations related to mobile and stationary sources 
of emissions, respectively. The Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) oversees the full range of 
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Environmental Justice Task Force to address compliance and enforcement in areas of California 
that “are burdened by multiple sources of pollution and disproportionately vulnerable to its 
effects” (CalEPA 2016). The Task Force has completed two pilot initiatives in Fresno (2013-
2014) and in the Boyle Heights and Pacoima neighborhoods of Los Angeles (2015-2016). The 
2016 Budget Act granted the Task Force, which was founded in 2013 as a working group, 
permanent funding (CalEPA 2013; CalEPA 2016).  
 The debate surrounding the question of whether enforcement disparities exist erupted 
after a 1992 study in the National Law Journal found that penalties for violations of pollution 
laws were on average 46 percent higher in white communities than in communities of color, and 
that communities of color took 20 percent longer to be listed as priority clean-up sites under the 
Superfund law (Bullard and Johnson 2000; Cole and Foster 2001: 57). That study has been 
criticized, however, for not disclosing key data such as sample sizes and sizes of the studied 
communities (Bryant 1993). It is nevertheless frequently cited as evidence of enforcement 
disparities (Agyeman 2005; Bullard and Johnson 2000; Pellow 2000).  
 In another quantitative study supporting the claim that enforcement is uneven, Konisky 
and Reenock (2013) find evidence that when enforcement authority is highly centralized near the 
top of an agency’s chain of command, an increase in the percentage of Hispanic residents in a 
community correlates with a decrease in rates of detection of noncompliance. That means that 
when there are more Hispanic residents, inspectors are less likely to find a that a facility is out of 
compliance. In contrast, when field officers have a high degree of enforcement authority, 
                                                          
processes related to hazardous substances; in addition, CalEPA delegates regulation of some hazardous materials to 
local agencies known as California Unified Program Agencies (CUPAs). The California Department of Pesticide 
Regulation delegates pesticide registration, monitoring, and enforcement to its 55 county agricultural 
commissioners. The State Water Resources Control Board regulates over 37,000 facilities and is charged with 
protecting California’s water resources, including drinking water. Finally, CalRecycle partners with local and state 
agencies to oversee recycling facilities including but not limited to composting sites, beverage container processors, 
and landfills. 
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detection of noncompliance is not affected by the percentage of Hispanic residents in a 
community. In that case, findings of noncompliance are consistent regardless of the percentage 
of Hispanic residents. The research also suggests that the degree of mobilization around 
environmental justice issues in a community positively affects the rate of detection of 
noncompliance. The implications of their study seem to be that, at least in some cases, the 
demographic characteristics and political engagement of a community may influence regulators’ 
compliance monitoring. 
 Despite the lack of clear conclusions drawn from quantitative studies attempting to 
discern whether race or income status affect monitoring and enforcement, a wealth of case 
studies demonstrates numerous instances when enforcement has been lacking or weak in low-
income and people of color communities. One recent and particularly egregious example of weak 
enforcement is the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, where city officials began treating Flint River 
water without corrosion control, which allowed water to eat away at aging service lines, 
exposing residents of the city to toxic levels of lead (Flint Water Advisory Task Force 2016). 
The Flint Water Advisory Task Force, appointed by Governor Rick Snyder in October of 2015 to 
conduct an independent review, found that the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
failed to enforce the Safe Drinking Water Act. In addition, the U.S. EPA did not issue an order to 
the state regulatory agency to comply with that Act, as it is required to do by law. The Task 
Force noted, “EPA’s conduct casts doubt on its willingness to aggressively pursue enforcement 
(in the absence of widespread public outrage)” (Flint Water Advisory Task Force 2016: 8-9). 
The case studies described below cast similar doubt on the enforcement activities (or lack 
thereof) of a range of state and federal agencies tasked with environmental protection. 
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 The experience of the Holt family, an African American family living in Dickson City, 
Tennessee, provides an example of differential enforcement, where race appears to play a 
significant role in determining the response of government agencies. In this case, the Tennessee 
Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) repeatedly granted permits to a county 
landfill that was polluting groundwater near a mostly African American community, despite 
numerous violations (Bullard 2012). Fifty-four feet away from the landfill, the Holts owned and 
operated a farm with a well that they used for drinking water. Although government tests on the 
Holts’ well in 1988 farm revealed contamination by trichloroethylene (TCE), which was at the 
time was a suspected carcinogen and is now categorized as “a ‘very hazardous mutagenic cancer-
causing chemical” (Bullard 2012: 133), the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment 
assured them that their water quality was good and that the TCE levels were likely lab errors or 
sampling errors. Over the next twelve years, TDEC and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency both expressed concerns internally about the possibility of contamination of the Holts’ 
well, yet they never shared any information about these discussions with the family. Finally, in 
2000, the Holt family’s wells were retested and registered TCE levels twenty-nine times the 
maximum contaminant level allowable by the EPA (Bullard 2012: 137). Meanwhile, when 
spring water used by a white family in the same county was found to be contaminated with TCE, 
county officials acted swiftly to notify the families, place them on the city tap system, and 
perform nine tests on the spring over seven years, well after the family had stopped using the 
spring for drinking water. 
 A case of environmental racism in West Ocala, Florida, further illustrates how, despite 
vigorous community organizing, enforcement can be weak or non-existent in people of color 
communities that already suffer from the disproportionate siting of industrial facilities in their 
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neighborhoods. In this case, residents living close to a plant that baked scrap wood into charcoal 
briquettes frequently found ash covering their cars, windows, and even surfaces inside their 
homes. Concerned residents wrote letters to city, state, and federal officials describing health 
issues resulting from persistent pollution emitted by the Royal Oak plant (Lerner 2010), yet the 
state of Florida failed to investigate or enforce the Clean Air Act. Activism against Royal Oak 
began in 1982 when resident Leroy Reed testified before the city council about the health effects 
of the pollution, yet it was not until September of 2005 that the state finally investigated. In their 
investigation, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) officials found emissions of 
methanol, a highly neurotoxic chemical, at nine times the amount legally permitted. In addition, 
the company had lied about having installed afterburners, which protect public health by 
reducing the amount of particulate emissions. In all, DEP found nine potential violations of the 
Clean Air Act (Lerner 2010). Almost immediately, Royal Oak officials closed the plant, 23 years 
after residents began pleading with regulators to protect their health by investigating the content 
and cause of the soot blanketing their neighborhoods.  
 Although California’s enforcement apparatus is vast and is increasingly focused on 
justice, concerns remain about the efficacy of environmental enforcement generally and in 
California specifically.  While Gray and Shimshack (2011) argue that deterrence is highly 
effective in achieving industry compliance, others offer more critical interpretations. Reisinger et 
al. (2010) argue that this country’s enforcement model has proven ineffective, leaving many laws 
unenforced, and that the political climate of resistance to regulation and the tightening of state 
agency budgets have further constrained the effectiveness of enforcement measures. Further, 
citizen suit provisions, included in most major environmental laws, allow public interest groups 
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to sue the government and polluting entities for alleged violations; however, these suits are 
increasingly hampered by procedural obstacles (Reisinger et al. 2010: 61). 
 In 2014 in California, the U.S. EPA found that a battery recycling facility owned by 
Exide Technologies, located in the low-income and predominantly Hispanic neighborhood of 
Vernon in Los Angeles, had violated the Clean Air Act’s emissions standards over 30 times since 
the year 2000 (Kim 2014). The following year, in a settlement with the U.S. Attorney’s office, 
the company admitted to the illegal disposal, storage, shipment, and transportation of hazardous 
waste, all four of which are felony offenses (KPCC March 12 2015). Despite violations 
documented by the California Department of Toxic Substances Control over several decades, the 
department continued to allow the Exide plant to operate on a temporary permit. Activists in the 
community had agitated for years for the closure and cleanup of the Exide site, yet the response 
from government agencies was slow until the U.S. Attorney’s office stepped in. Cleanup and 
lead testing in the roughly 10,000 potentially contaminated homes near the now-vacant plant 
continues, but progress remains slow and frustrations among affected community members 
continue to run high (Lopez 2016).  
 By contrast, when a methane gas leak occurred at a Southern California Gas Company 
facility in the affluent, mostly white neighborhood of Porter Ranch in the San Fernando Valley in 
northwest Los Angeles, the state responded swiftly. In September of 2016, the utility reached a 
settlement with L.A. County prosecutors that included safety measures far exceeding state and 
local regulations (Walton 2016). The leak forced 8,000 residents out of their homes, and before 
they moved home, the company cleaned 1,500 home interiors and 1,200 exteriors, in addition to 
public facilities such as schools and parks (Walton 2016). One year after the Exide plant shut 
down, just 200 properties had been cleaned in southeastern Los Angeles (Lopez 2016). 
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Community advocates in the Commerce, Bell, Huntington Park, East Los Angeles and Boyle 
Heights noticed the disparities between how their environmental health crisis and the one in 
Porter Ranch unfolded, finding them disappointing but far from surprising (Martinez 2016).  
 In addition to limitations on effective enforcement built into the system, specific 
instances in California, such as the Exide case, have galvanized communities to speak out about 
inadequate government responses to environmental violations. In another particularly glaring 
case, the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) failed to recoup nearly $200 million 
of taxpayer money meant to remediate hazardous waste sites or to remedy the fact that, for 
decades, numerous hazardous waste facilities were operating on outdated permits with weak 
environmental protections (Independent Review Panel 2016; Los Angeles Times Editorial Board 
2014). In 2015, an independent review panel monitored ongoing problems within DTSC 
including weak enforcement, a backlog of expired permits, and failure to collect money the state 
was owed for cleaning contaminated sites (Barboza 2015). Incidences of severe pesticide drift 
also illustrate how residents have had to struggle to have their experiences of environmental 
violations taken seriously. For example, in Arvin, California, in 2002, the Department of 
Pesticide Regulation (DPR) found that 252 were sickened by the pesticide metam sodium. DPR 
investigated, despite the refusal of the County Agricultural Commissioner to find out how many 
people were sickened or to delegate the task to the Department of Environmental Health. Only 
extensive grassroots activism and the serendipitous presence of a reporter who captured their 
work interviewing victims of the incident, caught the attention of DPR (Perkins n.d.). These and 
similar incidents have led activists to demand more accountable, transparent, and responsive 
enforcement.  
Effective Participation in Environmental Decision-Making 
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 The call for procedural justice raises the question of what constitutes meaningful public 
participation. What is meaningful involvement in decision-making processes, and what is simply 
placation? Even collaborative processes heralded as innovative and inclusive can marginalize 
environmental justice, so we must address the question of how to develop participatory processes 
that respect and respond to participants’ knowledge and concerns (Shilling et al. 2009). Citizen 
participation in governance is most meaningful when there is real power redistribution from 
government to those seeking a voice in the process of policy development and implementation 
(Arnstein 1969; Cole and Foster 2001). Arnstein’s typology of citizen participation breaks 
participation into a ladder of eight categories climbing from forms of non-participation such as 
manipulation by government, to power-sharing arrangements, such as partnership, delegated 
power, and citizen control. Her schematic illustrates that participation exists along a gradient 
from total government control to total citizen control, and that lip-service to participation 
sometimes obscures exclusion.  
 Much of the grassroots organizing characteristic of the environmental justice movement 
has occurred despite of or in opposition to the state, rather than through participation in formal 
decision-making processes. For example, many communities adjacent to or downwind of heavy 
industry have attempted to improve monitoring of air pollution and enforcement of 
environmental regulations through community-based monitoring. The primary motivation 
driving the work of these networks, some of which are known as “bucket brigades” because of 
the modified five-gallon buckets in which they collect air samples, is the desire “to shift power 
relations by allowing the community to access information that it alone controls” (Scott 2016: 
266). For these communities, the data itself is a source of power. While community-based 
environmental monitoring networks have galvanized residents and generated copious evidence of 
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environmental health hazards, O’Rourke and Macey (2003) argue that “[w]here the bucket 
brigades have yet to succeed is in promoting a division of roles between residents and the state 
that can form a basis for the co-production of environmental protection” (407). They argue that 
the data generated by bucket brigades can best influence the management of emitting facilities if 
monitoring groups and regulators work together closely and on a regular basis. While advocating 
for co-production of environmental monitoring, the authors also acknowledge that “a lack of co-
production limits the corruption or capture of community policing efforts,” hinting at the need to 
take care in developing relationships between communities and public agencies (O’Rourke and 
Macey 2003: 409).  
  Lee (2005) articulates several key advantages associated with a collaborative approach to 
environmental justice issues that includes industry, government, and other institutions. A 
collaborative model “fosters an integrated approach,” “promotes multi-agency coordination” and 
“establishes multi-stakeholder partnerships to leverage human, organization, technical, and 
financial resources” (Lee 2005: 221). To illustrate the value of the collaborative approach, Lee 
interviewed Maria Moya and Paula Forbis with the Environmental Health Coalition (EHC) in 
San Diego, who spearheaded a collaborative process to initiate land use reforms in the Barrio 
Logan neighborhood of that city. The transcripts reveal that key components must be in place for 
collaborative approaches to be effective. In EHC’s case, those components included a neutral 
facilitator, equal responsibility for major stakeholders, and partnering agreements that required 
interested parties to acknowledge the problem of environmental injustice as a prerequisite to 
becoming full partners in the project were essential to effective collaboration (Lee 2005).  
 Whereas Lee employs case studies to illustrate the potential value of collaborative 
approaches to environmental justice issues, Balazs and Lubell (2014) offer a theoretical 
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framework for analyzing collaborative endeavors. First, participation in a collaborative process 
can catalyze social learning, which allows stakeholders to connect in flexible networks, develop 
social capital and trust, and collectively shape institutional change. The authors argue that the 
role of social learning, a form of learning that occurs among varying stakeholders, is under-
developed in environmental justice literature, which has emphasized instead how traditionally 
marginalized groups learn from participation in environmental decision-making. Importantly, 
Balazs and Lubell (2014: 99) posit social learning as a potential link between procedural and 
distributive justice, suggesting that it acts as a tool to transform simply having a seat at the table 
to transforming material outcomes. So, in addition to the integrated approach and maximization 
of resources Lee points out as advantages, collaboration may also foster social learning that can 
improve outcomes for disadvantaged communities. 
Barriers to Effective Participation  
 Although procedural justice is a cornerstone of the environmental justice movement and 
citizen participation a key component of American democracy in theory, a significant body of 
literature has questioned the efficacy of participation in state environmental justice frameworks 
and of collaborative approaches. Despite increased official recognition of environmental justice 
in federal and state policy, scholars have articulated a series of challenges to achieving equity by 
relying on the state to support movement objectives. Benford (2005: 50) notes with disapproval 
how far the environmental justice movement has traveled from the environmental racism 
discourse and direct action tactics on display in Warren County to “more acceptable, less 
confrontational” and more collaborative framings. While public agencies might be willing to 
grant environmental justice activists a seat at the table today, he remains concerned that the 
movement’s emphasis on justice locks activists in to a dependence on the legislative and judicial 
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system, “an ironic commitment to, and reaffirmation of, the systemic status quo” (Benford 2005: 
51). Other literature echoes his concerns.  
 In particular, Pulido et al. (2016: 27) exhibit deep skepticism about the ultimate utility of 
activists’ reliance on and engagement with the state. “The state,” they assert, “is not about to 
eliminate the necessary ‘sinks’ that communities of color provide, for fear of both capital flight 
and the wrath of conservatives. Instead, the state gives lip-service to environmental justice but 
in fact does little to change the materiality of disproportionate pollution patterns.” They argue 
that instead of viewing the state as a partner, the environmental justice movement should 
identify the state as the adversary and challenge it directly rather than participating in empty 
processes that fail to offer substantive changes. Sandweiss (1998) offers a similar assessment, 
arguing that while the environmental justice movement and government agencies tend to agree 
on problem definition (low-income people of color are disproportionately burdened by 
pollution), consensus is lacking over the root causes of that disproportionate exposure, the 
associated health risks, and the best solutions to the problem. The federal government has been 
reluctant to frame environmental justice as a problem rooted in structural racism, emphasizing 
economic status instead. Liévanos (2012) argues that it may be difficult for advocates to 
challenge state actors on the same conceptual terms after the state has institutionalized an 
environmental justice frame that differs significantly from movement framing. 
 In addition to the problem of different framings between movement actors and the state, 
activists have often found themselves forced to look outside of formal processes, even those 
supposedly designed for their participation, to ensure that their concerns are ultimately 
addressed. As Cole and Foster (2001) note, many environmental laws provide for participation, 
but they leave social relations in place, leading to the same marginalization of the experiences 
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and perspectives of poor people of color that causes environmental injustice in the first place. 
Environmental decision-making provisions for environmental justice tend to focus on 
procedural rights instead of substantive ones, which has meant that activists may participate in 
environmental decision-making, but their participation does not necessarily result in substantive 
changes to policy (Sandweiss 1998). 
 A third challenge to meaningful public participation of communities affected by 
environmental injustice is that the knowledge valued in regulatory processes is often scientific 
expertise, which the lay public often lacks (Fiorino 2000). For example, for regulators to 
investigate claims of illegal pollution, the knowledge held by communities based on their lived 
experience, such as the experience of intense odors and associated physical symptoms, needs to 
be translated into forms acceptable to the standards used by regulators. Scott (2016: 279) 
explains, “The situation both forces residents to fall back on their senses and demands that they 
transcribe their collective knowledge into new, and foreign, forms. It is an in-between, 
uncomfortable place.” Although it is important not to reify or essentialize either local or 
professional knowledge (Corburn 2007), community mistrust and perception of lack of respect 
for local environmental knowledge remain significant barriers to effective collaboration (Lynn 
2000). Despite the barriers presented by the divide between local and professional knowledge, 
Corburn (2007: 158) argues that local knowledge can “extend the knowledge-base used for 
decision-making” and suggests that co-production of knowledge can contribute to procedural 
justice by increasing meaningful participation in environmental policy processes. 
IVAN and Environmental Justice 
 Whether the environmental justice movement’s engagement with state frameworks, 
participation in formal decision-making processes, and involvement in collaborative approaches 
28 
can generate substantive improvements in burdened communities remains a subject of debate and 
inquiry. The skepticism toward those approaches in much of the literature suggests that activists 
seeking to achieve environmental justice by these less oppositional tactics may face significant 
challenges. The fact remains, however, that environmental justice increasingly has been 
institutionalized in the form of state policies and statutes, in part through grassroots pressure 
(Targ 2005), and ongoing interaction between activists and government agencies represents a 
possible path toward mitigating environmental health disparities. Short of undermining a 
capitalist system premised on environmental racism (Cole and Foster 2001; Pulido et al. 2016), 
collaborative approaches to enforcement may offer the possibility of increased mutual 
recognition and respect among stakeholders, a greater sense of individual and collective power 
among residents, and more robust monitoring and enforcement in otherwise marginalized 
communities (Cole and Foster 2001; O’Rourke and Macey 2003).  
 Enforcement is an area of policy that is not sufficiently addressed in literature addressing 
collaboration and engagement with state environmental justice frameworks and is of significant 
concern to residents who bear the consequences of weak responses to environmental violations. 
Mindful of how power dynamics of social relations and the bureaucratic incentives favoring lax 
enforcement may impinge on collaborative approaches (Konisky and Reenock 2013), this project 
asks to what extent collaborative models can contribute to environmental justice in enforcement. 
I use case studies of two different IVAN sites to address that question.  
 The IVAN program offers intriguing cases because IVAN is a community-based effort 
outside of the formal enforcement process, yet it features ongoing partnerships between public 
agency staff and community organizations. It facilitates public participation in enforcement, but 
instead of government bringing the public to the table, IVAN invites public officials to 
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participate in a community process. IVAN grew out of a dynamic of ongoing tension between 
communities demanding stronger enforcement and state government gradually yielding to the 
mounting pressure. These cases offer an opportunity to examine an innovative environmental 
justice organizing strategy that builds spaces for public participation by bringing stakeholders 
together on the terms of residents in affected communities.  
 I have asked two related questions of these cases. First, how are the interactions between 
community organizations and public agencies structured and how do they function? I am 
interested in how the interactions between public agencies, community organizations, and 
residents enhance and/or constrain IVAN’s capacity to both address community values and 
concerns and improve environmental enforcement. I have paid especially close attention to 
whether and how different stakeholders negotiate knowledge claims at Taskforce meetings and 
considered to what extent environmental protection is co-produced through the relationship 
between public agencies and community organizations and residents, and through what 
processes. In addition, as described in the methods section below, by analyzing responses to 
interview questions and field notes from Task Force meetings, I have considered whether 
problem definition is contested terrain within the partnerships that comprise IVAN’s Task 
Forces. In other words, is there consensus as to the problems IVAN is addressing, the perceived 
sources of those problems, and the proposed solutions (Benford and Snow 2000), and what 
consequences do variations in reasons for participating and desired outcomes have for the 
success of the partnership. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 This study used a qualitative approach, which allowed me to gather and analyze data in a 
way that emphasizes the “social meaning people attribute to their experiences, circumstances, 
and situations” (Hesse-Biber 2017: 4). A qualitative approach is particularly well suited to 
projects that seek to understand and value multiple subjective perspectives, which I have aimed 
to do in my study of participants’ perspectives on IVAN (Hesse-Biber 2017). Conducting two 
case studies of sites within the IVAN network allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the 
interactions at the heart of the Environmental Justice Task Forces; focusing on two sites made it 
possible to gather comparative data on multiple experiences. I have used in-depth, semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis to yield a fairly robust set 
of data that can be triangulated to enhance reliability (Hesse-Biber 2017). The data has been used 
for two purposes: first, to review the structure and function of the Environmental Justice Task 
Forces, by which I mean who participates in the Task Forces, what the roles and responsibilities 
of participants are, the content and format of meetings, and what roles IVAN plays in the 
communities where it operates. Second, the data has been used to evaluate the degree to which 
IVAN is effective in serving the functions described by Task Force members.  
Site Selection  
 To achieve an in-depth understanding of the structure and function of the partnerships in 
IVAN’s Task Forces, I gathered and analyzed data on a sample of two out of the seven IVAN 
sites: Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley. Studying this small sample allowed me to 
develop a robust understanding of each of the two sites and to draw comparisons and contrasts 
between them. There are five rural and two urban sites within IVAN, so I opted to study one 
urban site (Bayview Hunters Point) and one rural site (Imperial Valley) to represent that 
31 
distribution. The Imperial Valley site was established first, in 2009, and the Bayview Hunters 
Point site in San Francisco, established in 2015, is the most recent addition to the network. 
Including the oldest and newest sites allowed me to capture a range of experiences in IVAN’s 
Task Forces as group processes evolve over time.  
 The IVAN sites are geographically dispersed across the state, and studying two 
geographically distant regions rather than two neighboring areas allowed me to compare and 
contrast features of the network arising out of very different economic, political, ecological, 
topographical, and social conditions. Figure 3 shows the seven IVAN sites and an eighth that is 
planned to begin operating in Sacramento; Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley are 
circled. One of the limitations of the study is that I do not include a site in the Central Valley, 
which includes the Fresno, Kings, and Kern IVAN sites. That region is well-known for poor air 
quality from a variety of sources of pollution, including agriculture, diesel truck emissions, and 
oil and gas extraction, and including one site in the Central Valley would have made it possible 
to offer a more comprehensive look at the range of concerns in environmental justice 
communities in California. For the purposes of this study, however, I chose to sacrifice some 
breadth for the additional depth I gained by focusing on just two sites.  
Gathering Data  
 I used a combination of purposive sampling and snowball sampling to select interview 
participants from each of the two Environmental Justice Task Forces to interview. The 
interviews took place between January and March of 2017. I conducted 16 interviews with 18 
participants with a response rate of 100 percent. In two instances, individuals whom I had 
planned to interview requested that another staff person join the interview. The interviews ranged 
in length from 42 minutes to 1 hour and 50 minutes with an average duration of 66 minutes. 
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Most interviews were conducted face to face; however, one interview with a community member 
from San Francisco was conducted entirely over the phone and two other interviews with 
participants in the Bayview Hunters Point IVAN were initiated in person and completed over the 
phone due to time constraints. The quality of the interviews conducted over the phone was 
consistent with that of the in-person interviews, perhaps because all the participants and I had 
previously met face to face before our phone conversations.  
 Among public agency staff, I planned to interview the government problem-solver, the 
government Task Force chair, and the public agency staff member who has attended the most 
IVAN meetings. In Bayview Hunters Point, however, I learned that the Task Force is 
community-led, so there is neither a government Task Force chair nor a government problem-
solver. There are, however, many public officials who regularly attend Task Force meetings and 
participate actively. Therefore, in choosing public agency staff to interview, I looked for 
participants who work at different levels of government and have attended all or nearly all of the 
Task Force meetings. The interviewees included: two EPA officials who oversee the cleanup of 
the Hunters Point Navy Shipyard Superfund site; three San Francisco Department of 
Environment Environmental Justice Program staff members; and one employee of the State 
Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) whose involvement with IVAN dates back to 
its inception. In the Imperial Valley, state government officials play a more active role in 
facilitating meetings and problem-solving, so the selection of participants matched my selection 
criteria. Two of the government interviewees work for the DTSC/Imperial Certified Unified 
Programs Agency (CUPA), which is a state office that performs both a state and a local function. 
In California, CUPAs coordinate a variety of local environmental protection enforcement 
functions into a single program; they are usually administered locally, but in Imperial County the 
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state agency runs the CUPA (DTSC 2010). Among government staff in Imperial, I interviewed: 
the problem-solver, who is an employee of the DTSC/Imperial CUPA; the government chair, 
also with DTSC/Imperial CUPA, and an employee of the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB), who among government agency staff has attended the most IVAN-Imperial meetings 
since January 2014 (which is as far back as I was able to obtain attendance records).  
 Among community organization staff, I planned to interview the community problem-
solver, who is the person within the convening organization responsible for following up on 
complaints filed by community members. In Bayview Hunters Point the convening organization 
is Greenaction, and in the Imperial Valley it is Comité Civico del Valle (CCDV). Greenaction is 
a grassroots organization that builds community power and advocates for environmental justice 
in low-income communities across the United States (Greenaction 2017). Based in Brawley, 
California, CCDV’s mission is to “improve access to health services, research, community 
service programs, and environmental justice to disadvantaged communities by way of education, 
capacity building, and civic participation” (CCDV 2016). I intended the second community 
organization interview to be with the Community Task Force Chair. In early conversations with 
staff at both Greenaction and CCDV, I realized that the roles of the staff members at the 
convening organizations in the EJ Task Force meetings are less clearly defined than I had 
anticipated. Nevertheless, there were two staff members at each organization whose were clearly 
the most involved with IVAN, based on the duration of their involvement and the frequency with 
which they attend Task Force meetings, and so at each site those were the two whom I selected 
for participation in this study. 
 I used several methods to select community members to interview, including asking for 
suggestions from Greenaction and CCDV staff members, acting on suggestions from residents to 
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reach additional interviewees, and identifying particularly heavily involved participants in my 
field observations in November 2016. Because the pool of regular participants from the 
community is quite small, many of the suggestions made to me were the same names I identified 
through participant-observation at the November Task Force meeting. In Imperial, where the 
Task Force has been meeting monthly for eight years, there were some community members 
who used to attend but no longer come to meetings. I opted to interview currently active 
participants so that I could consider their responses in light of their participation in Task Force 
meetings, and vice versa. I interviewed two participants in Bayview Hunters Point, one a long-
time resident of the Bayview neighborhood and the other a resident of Little Hollywood, a 
neighborhood just south of Bayview Hunters Point. In the Imperial Valley, I interviewed three 
residents, one of whom lives in the tiny desert community of Ocotillo, another who resides in the 
town of Imperial, and a third who lives just south of the border in Mexicali.  
 In-depth, semi-structured interviews are issue-oriented conversations that assume “that 
individuals have unique and important knowledge about the social world that is ascertainable and 
able to be shared through verbal communication” (Hesse-Biber 2017: 106). In this study, reasons 
for and ways of participating in IVAN varied widely, so interviews allowed multiple 
perspectives to emerge regarding a defining characteristic of IVAN’s Taskforces: partnerships 
between community organizations and public agencies. Topics discussed during the interviews 
included the purpose of IVAN; the history of IVAN in the region where the interview is taking 
place; how participants became involved with IVAN; the roles and responsibilities of residents, 
community organization staff, and public agency staff; the benefits and challenges of partnership 
with public agencies; and perceptions of the ways that partnership furthers or constrains progress 
toward environmental justice. Although I prepared an interview guide with the same set of pre-
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determined questions for each interviewee, the order in which I asked those questions varied 
depending on the form each conversation took. Several participants seemed to feel most 
comfortable with a more structured interview format that moved straight through the interview 
guide as planned, whereas in other interviews, the conservation took a more meandering path 
toward addressing the questions I had in mind.  
 Participant observation in the Environmental Justice Task Force meetings allowed me to 
venture a bit into the “social worlds” of the IVAN networks and provide “thick descriptions” of 
the interactions among stakeholders in the network (Hesse-Biber 2017: 183). Between November 
2016 and February 2017, I attended three of the two-hour-long monthly Task Force meetings in 
Bayview Hunters Point and three in the Imperial Valley. The Bayview Hunters Point meetings 
take place the third Wednesday of each month. They alternate monthly between afternoon and 
evening meetings. The afternoon meetings take place at Southeast Community College in the 
Alex Pitcher Room, a cavernous basement meeting space often used for community functions. 
Evening meetings, a new addition this year to try to better accommodate residents’ schedules, 
convene at the historic Bayview Opera House, which is a neighborhood landmark originally built 
in 1888 as a cultural center for what was then the slaughterhouse hub for the city. In Imperial 
Valley, the local DTSC office in El Centro hosts the meetings on the third Thursday of each 
month from three to five in the afternoon. At Task Force meetings, I observed as community 
members, community organization staff, and public agency staff convened to discuss ongoing 
efforts to improve environmental conditions, listen to and discuss presentations from various 
agencies, and to review recently filed complaints. I gained permission to record the January and 
February meetings in Imperial County and the February meeting in Bayview Hunters Point; 
during the meetings prior to my receiving that permission, I took notes by hand.  
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  Usually, ethnographic research involves extensive observation and participation among 
the people being studied; one limitation of my research is that the duration of my participant 
observation was brief. Participant observation supplements interview data and document analysis 
with descriptive detail and an illustration of the social dynamics at play during Environmental 
Justice Taskforce meetings. Doing one round of participant observation before conducting 
interviews allowed me to better understand the basic structure of IVAN and to develop at least an 
intuitive understanding of the working relationships among participants. This first round of 
participant observation raised questions that I was able to then incorporate into my interview 
guide. I have been cautious, however, not to draw broad conclusions about participants’ 
perspectives based solely on these relatively brief periods of observation. 
 In addition to formal participant observation at Task Force meetings, I have had several 
opportunities to get to know IVAN participants in more informal settings. In January, two 
community members met me in El Centro and gave me a tour of the area so that I could see and 
experience for myself some of the concerns they face in their daily lives. We drove by the local 
high school, which is surrounded by agricultural fields on three sides and backs onto a major 
interstate. We also drove to an illegal dump site on private property containing hundreds of 
fluorescent tubes, old CPUs, tires with standing water inside, and vast quantities of other debris. 
We took photos and filed a report on one of the community members’ phones. After the IVAN-
Imperial meetings in January and February, I joined residents and government agency staff at the 
Denny’s across the interstate from the DTSC office. This dinner is a monthly ritual where 
conversations started at the meeting hours earlier are continued on a more informal basis. From 
my perspective, these experiences in the Imperial Valley built some trust between me and the 
Task Force members. They also shifted me from my standpoint of being largely an observer to 
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one in which I had at least some of the experience of being a participant at the Task Force and in 
the community. Although I did not have the same opportunity to get to know participants in the 
Bayview Hunters Point Task Force in informal settings, simply being present at meetings and 
speaking casually with participants before and after meetings was useful in building rapport and 
establishing a foundation of trust before conducting interviews.  
 Document analysis provided additional information to help describe the structure, 
function, and development of IVAN. Publicly available documents published by CalEPA and the 
DTSC; research conducted for IVAN suggesting performance measures; and documents 
published by the communications that coordinate IVAN (Greenaction in Bayview Hunters Point 
and Comité Civico del Valle in Imperial), offered important contextual information. In addition, 
Task Force minutes for meetings in Bayview Hunters Point prior to my participant observation 
extended my understanding of the network; however, meeting minutes are not taken in the 
Imperial Valley. Finally, I used the attendance records from the IVAN-Imperial meetings from 
2014 through 2016 to track who has attended those meetings over the years so that I could verify 
statements from current participants about who tends to attend or not attend IVAN meetings. 
Collectively, these documents helped explain the need for IVAN in these regions and describe 
the context of environmental justice efforts within which IVAN is situated, both within state 
government and among community organizations and grassroots activism. 
Analysis 
 Interviews and participant observation were recorded and transcribed to maximize efforts 
to represent various perspectives fairly and accurately. Two interview participants preferred that 
their interviews not be recorded, so I took extensive notes on my laptop during those interviews 
to capture as much as possible of what was said. A grounded theory approach informed my 
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process of inductive analysis; however, I also drew on theory developed in the literature on 
environmental justice to raise questions about IVAN and help develop deductive categories 
within my major topics. Grounded theory, as Hesse-Biber (2017: 316) notes, “starts from an 
engagement with the data and ends with a theory that is generated from or grounded in the data.” 
This means that the researcher engages with the data to generate meaning rather than working 
purely deductively. I began content analysis using open coding to develop major topics and 
categories within those topics; the process of categorization was also informed by existing 
theory. As a consistent set of categories and themes emerged, I began selectively coding but 
remained open to the possibility that new categories or themes might emerge late in the process 
of content analysis.  
 As I developed my analysis, I looked carefully for opportunities to compare and contrast 
the perspectives of participants in different IVAN sites and the perspectives of actors playing 
different roles within each network. For example, I paid attention to whether patterns emerge in 
the responses of public agency staff regarding the purpose of IVAN and how their responses 
compared with responses of residents and of community organization staff. This analysis 
supported the elaboration of existing theory on the role of collaboration and public participation 
in environmental justice, which helped me respond to the question of how innovative models, 
particularly in the realm of monitoring and enforcement, can contribute to movement toward 
environmental justice. 
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RESULTS 
Participation 
 Understanding how Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN) addresses 
environmental justice first necessitates a description of who participates, what that involves, and 
why they take part. There are two primary ways for people to utilize IVAN: by filing complaints 
on the IVAN website, and/or by joining Task Force meetings. In this project, I interviewed 
people who attend Task Force meetings. In some cases, those active in the Task Force also file 
complaints online; however, there are also people who file complaints online who do not attend 
meetings. Because their complaints are anonymous, it is not possible to follow up with those 
who report online to learn more about who they are and their motivations for reporting. Thus, the 
description that follows applies to participants in the Task Force component of IVAN, not the 
online complaint system. 
Bayview Hunters Point  
 Attendance at the Task Force meetings ranged from roughly 30 people to over 40 in the 
short window when I observed. I attended two afternoon meetings at Southeast Community 
college, in November and in February. About 30 people attended both the November meeting 
and the February meeting. In January, at an evening meeting at the Bayview Opera House, over 
40 people were present despite a soaking rain. At two of the three meetings, government 
agencies were the most heavily represented; only at the February meeting did non-profit 
organization representation match the government presence. In November and January, non-
profit organizations comprised the second-largest group, and residents not working as staff or 
interns for non-profit organizations made up the smallest group. In February, eleven government 
employees from city, regional, state, and federal agencies attended. Eleven staff members and 
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volunteers with non-profits attended, representing Greenaction, the San Francisco Conservation 
Corps, the San Francisco Parks Alliance, Literacy for Environmental Justice (LEJ), and 
Manylabs, an organization that promotes the use of mathematics and data science to fuel civic 
change (Manylabs 2017). Of the five residents present, two noted that they live in communities 
just south of Bayview Hunters Point, and at least two of the remaining three live in Bayview 
itself.  
 The community organization and resident categories overlap significantly. I distinguish 
between the two based whether they introduced themselves at the beginning of Task Force 
meetings as residents or as being affiliated with an organization. Of the two staff members from 
Literacy for Environmental Justice who were present, one grew up in Bayview Hunters Point. Of 
the four participants at the meeting affiliated with Greenaction, at least one, Marie Harrison, is a 
resident of Bayview Hunters Point, and her involvement in IVAN is both professional and 
deeply personal. As she explained during our interview, “I absolutely love this community. I 
love the people in this community. They’re not all wonderful, beautiful people and they’re not all 
horrible, ugly people either. Have you ever just loved a community?”   
 Similarly, at least three of the five attendees who self-described as “residents” during 
introductions at the beginning of the meeting are also active in at least one organization related to 
environmental justice. For example, one resident participates in Huntersview Mothers & Fathers 
Committee for Health and Environmental Justice, which educates and empowers public housing 
tenants about environmental health problems facing the Bayview neighborhood. Another, Dr. 
Ray Tompkins, summarized his involvement in the community this way:  
I lend my assistance to Greenaction. I'm the chair of the African American Health Equity 
Council on the Environment; I work with Clean Air Health Alliance … I sit on the 
Bayview Hunters Point Advisory to the [Southeast Health] Clinic, run by the San 
Francisco Health Department because I look at the environmental side of the health … I 
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used to sit on the Navy's Remediation Advisory Board on the cleanup of the Shipyard. I 
chaired the Technical Committee for six years; I was on the Board for twelve. 
 
In addition to his participation in IVAN, Tony, a resident of a community called Little 
Hollywood that lies south of Bayview Hunters Point, founded the Little Hollywood 
Improvement Committee. The residents who attend EJ Task Force meetings regularly are 
involved in other advocacy in addition to IVAN.   
 For residents, the primary motivations for engaging in IVAN are their concerns about 
quality of life, human health, and environmental justice. For example, Marie, who works with 
Greenaction but is also a resident of the community, described how her early advocacy was tied 
to her grandson’s asthma, which led her to question what was causing him to become ill. “And 
then I realized,” she said, “Well damn, the PG&E power plant was right here. And this stovepipe 
that was pumping out all the particulates was right here. His bedroom window, which was right 
across the street, was right here.” After a harrowing experience at the hospital, she explained, “I 
don’t know what it did to me, but it did something to me, so it caused me to vigorously start 
going after PG&E.” Another community resident, Leaotis, explained what drives him to attend 
during the November Task Force meeting, saying, “Sometimes I get tired of coming to meetings. 
Sometimes I get frustrated because I feel like we’re not getting no damn where. This is why I do 
this shit, because of people dying of cancer. Even if they don’t care about us, we got to care 
about ourselves.” For both these participants, deep concerns about the human health impacts of 
pollution, for themselves and for their neighbors, drove them into advocacy roles and to IVAN. 
 Environmental racism is a strong motivator for Dr. Tompkins, who is involved in a wide 
range of environmental health advocacy organizations. When asked why he attends IVAN 
meetings, he expressed a sense of responsibility, explaining that “it would be a betrayal” of his 
parents, who fled racial violence in Louisiana in the 1930s, and of civil rights activists who put 
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their bodies at risk for their cause, were he not to maintain optimism about the fate of the black 
communities in San Francisco. He said simply, “There’s got to be something better. I just can’t 
accept this shit.” Finally, Tony, who lives in Little Hollywood, got involved with IVAN because 
it was a vehicle to address a problem in his community, but, he said, “I knew from the beginning 
that if I was going to get some help, I was going to need to support them first … So I gave, and 
then they gave back, and I’m still giving back. And I’m committed to the larger picture of what’s 
good for the community even though it’s not necessarily my problem.” Although Tony and Dr. 
Tompkins feel personally compelled to remain involved with IVAN for slightly different 
reasons, both are committed to working for the public interest, just like Marie and Lee. 
 The government employees I spoke with have all been attending Task Force meetings 
since establishment of the Bayview Hunters Point IVAN. In some cases, they participate because 
their departments have supported the development of IVAN statewide, as in the case of DTSC, 
and in other instances, because Greenaction reached out to the agency directly. Three staff 
members at SFE met with Greenaction prior to the 2015 launch of IVAN to help them plan, and 
they try to send one or more staff from their EJ team to each meeting. Roger Kintz, state 
Environmental Justice Coordinator for DTSC, explained that he is the designated liaison from his 
department to the Bayview Hunters Point Task Force “to provide technical support and 
representation on toxics issues and environmental justice issues, and issues related to DTSC.” 
Two U.S. EPA employees who attend Task Force meetings regularly explained that they became 
involved in IVAN initially because they were requested to by Marie Harrison of Greenaction: 
“she’s a well-respected person in the community, and so she was pulling all her strings to make 
sure that the Task Force had the right people in it to help the community through any issues that 
they might bring up,” one of them said.  
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 Modes of participation in IVAN vary among individuals. Unlike in the example provided 
by Lee (2005), there are no formal partnering agreements between government agencies and 
Greenaction or CCDV, nor do parameters exist describing how residents or non-profit 
organization representatives should participate. Despite the lack of formal partnering agreements, 
all the interviewees for this project expressed an intent to stay involved with IVAN. Government 
agency representatives described their role as giving input, trying to help respond to reports, 
occasionally advising Greenaction about how to route complaints to the correct agencies, and 
sharing information with community members. During Task Force meetings, most government 
representatives focus more heavily on sharing technical information and responding to questions.  
A few others participate both by sharing information and by directly addressing some of the 
structural and functional challenges associated with IVAN, such as the division of roles and 
responsibilities between government and private citizens, and how government can build trust 
among communities.  
 Greenaction facilitates Task Force meetings. To prepare, a team of Greenaction staff and 
volunteers look at the IVAN reports filed online between meetings each month and ensure that 
they are routed to the proper regulatory agencies for follow-up. In addition, a volunteer with 
Greenaction takes meeting minutes, which are posted online each month; the Bayview Hunters 
Point IVAN is the only site of the seven in California that posts meeting minutes monthly, 
providing a public record and affording the wider community an opportunity to stay current on 
what is happening in Task Force meetings even if they cannot attend. Other non-profit 
organizations’ participants mostly observed quietly during the months that I attended IVAN 
meetings, although meeting notes indicate that LEJ has participated vocally in the past, 
especially when the topic of illegal dumping has arisen during meetings.  
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 Three community members participated most vocally during my observations of IVAN 
meetings in San Francisco. One of those three explained to me, “My role has evolved from one 
of coming there with my own problems for our area and trying to get them solved to...we made a 
lot of progress on those, and now my role has morphed into trying to be a peacemaker and trying 
to be a unifier among a bunch of people that don't all agree.” When I asked him to elaborate on 
why he needed to be a peacemaker, he explained that one of his concerns is that “the few 
[community members] that do come down either have an axe to grind, and it might be a very 
legitimate concern that they have, but they're not always tremendously reasonable about how 
they present that concern.” He explained how he plays the peacemaker role as follows: “I try to 
call everybody on their bullshit. I try to do it very diplomatically, I try to be positive to all people 
and respectful of all different sides, and that takes a lot of time and effort. I've tried to make this 
case that the government people are not the enemy and they're not just sent here by their boss to 
bullshit us.” While this resident focuses on changing the tenor of meetings to facilitate 
collaborative problem-solving between community and government, the two other community 
members emphasize government accountability through their participation. For example, during 
a conversation in February about a cleanup of a toxic site along the waterfront in Southeast San 
Francisco that advocates perceived to be botched, one of them said, “We can’t allow this stuff to 
happen. It might be a small thing to some people, but it’s not small to us. Every bit of it matters, 
because there’s lives at stake.” Community participation varies more in tone and substance than 
that of non-profit organizations or government. 
 In every interview, Task Force members in San Francisco said that low participation 
among community members is a challenge facing IVAN in Bayview Hunters Point. Interviewees 
offered several explanations to account for low reporting rates and low meeting attendance, 
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including competing reporting systems and additional issues that compete for their time and 
attention, lack of awareness of IVAN, fear of reporting, and the normalization of environmental 
health hazards. Roger Kintz with DTSC explained, “Bayview Hunters Point doesn’t have a very 
high reporting rate, even though there are a lot of illegal dumping and things happening here. I’m 
not quite sure why that’s low. There’s competition with other government agency reporting 
systems, and I also think the community itself hasn’t had an opportunity and education to 
understand how to use IVAN effectively.” One U.S. EPA official who is a Community 
Involvement Specialist also noted that residents have multiple issues competing for their time 
and attention: “The community, you know, the ones who are active, they go to a lot of meetings 
… So they all came when IVAN first started, but then the numbers started getting smaller and 
smaller,” she said. This perspective was corroborated by another interviewee who noted that, in 
an environment of rapid gentrification, the major concerns of many Bayview Hunters Point 
residents are housing and jobs. She also noted that opinions differ about who should be 
responsible for increasing participation. She explained that government participants are 
concerned about the lack of turnout at meetings and want organizers on the ground to engage 
residents, whereas Greenaction wants agencies to find ways to increase community participation. 
The division of labor between government and community-based organizations remains 
contested, at least regarding this responsibility. Finally, another SFE staff member pointed out 
that fear and the normalization of hazards after years of neglect can be barriers to participation. 
He explained, “A lot of people are scared to complain. They feel like there might be retaliation 
from their landlord, or they’ve gotten so used to dealing with conditions that they just don’t 
expect that anything will be done, so why bother complaining?” Lacking a sense of efficacy, 
people are less likely to engage. 
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Imperial County 
 The Task Force meetings in Imperial tend to be much smaller gatherings than the ones in 
Bayview Hunters Point. Based on sign-in sheets at the DTSC office in El Centro, where 
meetings take place, an average of twelve people participate in person. Several more government 
staff typically join in over the phone, including a representative from U.S. EPA Region 9. Three 
community members attend regularly, as do two to four staff members from Comité Civico del 
Valle (CCDV). Humberto Lugo of CCDV and Roger Vintze from DTSC co-chair the Task 
Force. Since 2014, local government has participated with diminishing frequency. In 2016, two 
staffers from the County Agricultural Commissioner’s Office comprised the entirety of local 
government participation. Other local agencies that have sent staff in the past include the 
Imperial County Air Pollution Control District (APCD), the Imperial Irrigation District, the 
County Public Health Department, and Imperial County Planning and Development Services. 
The most frequent participants from state agencies are DTSC, the Colorado River Water Quality 
Control Board, and the California Air Resources Board (CARB). A staffer from the office of the 
California State Assembly member from the 56th District, of which Imperial County is part, also 
frequently attends IVAN-Imperial meetings, as does an employee of Spreckels Sugar, which has 
a factory in the county. 
 The community members who participate in IVAN-Imperial see it as a vehicle for change 
in a region where they perceive government is not typically responsive to their concerns. Anita, a 
resident of the town of Imperial, has been active in her community since the early 1990s and has 
worked with CCDV to protect the environment and public health. She explained that IVAN “has 
been like a channel for us to let the world know, or the state in this case, because here in the 
County we’re just not being heard.” Edie, another resident, told me, “I've spent since 1977 when 
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I moved to Imperial County dealing with environmental health and environmental justice and 
one disaster after another in Imperial County.” Her work has included protecting Native 
American sacred sites from development projects, as well as fighting hazardous waste landfills, 
waste incineration sites, a cyanide heap leach open pit gold mine, and a project called Wind 
Zero, which would have been a military and law enforcement training site within hundreds of 
feet of homes in Ocotillo, the tiny desert community thirty miles west of El Centro where Edie 
lives. “So, I just have learned a whole lot more than I ever wanted to know about zoning and 
planning, and when and why so many regulations are just ignored,” she told me. For her, 
participating in IVAN with representatives from the state and federal government and “having 
people care, because we don't get the level of care from people in departments in Imperial 
County that you would expect to care,” allows her to stay “hopeful that there will be changes.”  
 As in San Francisco, government agency participants were either requested to do so by 
CCDV or assigned the task by their supervisors to attend IVAN meetings. All three government 
agency staff members interviewed for this project described personal fulfillment derived from 
working with IVAN. The government co-chair, Roger, said that although competing priorities 
such as completing all of the inspections for the DTSC/Imperial County Certified Unified 
Program Agency (CUPA) can make devoting enough time to IVAN a challenge, “If I’m in the 
office, I’ll be at the Task Force meeting, because it has a lot of value to me. I really like it, and I 
know I don’t spend enough time on it.” Raquel, the problem-solver for IVAN-Imperial explained 
that for her, “I thought maybe this might be the way to see the changes that I want for the 
Valley.” She described taking a course in college that awakened her to the environmental justice 
challenges facing communities in Los Angeles and returning home to Imperial County to learn 
through IVAN that many of the same issues occur there. She expressed a sense of efficacy and 
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responsibility, saying, “I want to fight for people who can’t fight for themselves.” Finally, 
Hector, a CARB Air Pollution Specialist told me, “I enjoy this.” Later in our conversation he 
told me, “Once you establish friendships, then it’s like you’re doing it for your friends.”  
 Whereas in San Francisco, a staff member or volunteer from Greenaction facilitates the 
meetings, in Imperial County the problem-solver, a DTSC/Imperial CUPA staff member, acts as 
facilitator. The problem-solver reviews complaints filed during the previous month and reports 
back to the Task Force about where she forwarded the complaints and what response she got 
from the agency she contacted. Throughout the meetings in Imperial, participants voice questions 
and suggestions frequently. For example, in a discussion in January 2017 about a complaint 
related to truck idling in a residential neighborhood, a CCDV staff member who lives in the 
neighborhood where the trucks were idling asked Hector, an air pollution specialist with CARB, 
if he could send the Task Force a picture of the sticker that indicates certain trucks have 
permission to idle. Hector described the sticker and clarified, “[this occurred] in front of a 
residential area, so they shouldn’t be idling at all, regardless of whether they have a sticker or 
not.” In the exchange that followed, a DTSC employee and a resident asked a series of clarifying 
questions about CARB’s Truck and Bus regulation. Following this, the problem-solver herself 
asked, “So if I get complaints like this in the future, should I send them to APCD?” Hector 
explained that CARB does not have enough inspectors in the state to send them out in the 
evenings, but that some local entities have a Memo of Understanding (MOU) with CARB, 
allowing the local body to issue citations on some of the CARB regulations. He suggested, “You 
guys can pressure the entity in Imperial County to sign an MOU with us.” A community member 
joined in, “Well, what happened to your drones? … They’re only $100 … They come with a 
49 
camera,” suggesting slyly that CARB could extend their enforcement capacity by using drones to 
investigate complaints.  
 The conversation soon returned to the challenges of getting APCD to respond to pollution 
complaints and CARB’s small number of inspectors, before the group moved on to the next 
complaint. In this instance, the Task Force discussed a specific complaint, participants (including 
both government and residents) gained clarity on the relevant rules and processes related to 
enforcement in that case, and a suggestion was made about how the Task Force could act to 
improve enforcement on similar issues in the future. As in most discussions in Imperial, at least 
half of the people in the room participated in the conversation. The conversations in Imperial 
often lack the sense of urgency that propels meetings in Bayview Hunters Point, but the high 
level of engagement of participants allows the Task Force to be a space where government, 
residents, and community-based organizations learn from one another and collectively 
brainstorm novel potential solutions to environmental problems.  
 In interviews, participants elaborated on how they participate in Task Force meetings. 
Hector explained, “Most of the time I participate with issues that are air-related because it’s my 
area of expertise. But I do know about other areas, and I will participate when other things 
happen…if I find that nobody attended from a certain agency and there’s information that needs 
to be given to the other agency, then I will take it to the other agency.” Ray, the community 
member who asked where CARB’s drones are, wants to hold government accountable. He told 
me, “I introduce myself as a trouble-maker” and explained that he plays that role because he sees 
government agencies claiming they lack the funds to send inspectors out and unable or unwilling 
to conduct inspections on weekends or holidays, and “that mentality just drives me nutso!” He 
feels his role is to “put the knife in ‘em, because they’re not being responsive to their 
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constituents.” The staff members from CCDV mostly observe, aside from the co-chair, 
Humberto. Sometimes, however, they share information about the reports that have been filed 
that either they submitted themselves or that families they work with have filed.  
 As in San Francisco, most interviewees acknowledged that low participation is a 
challenge for IVAN-Imperial. In contrast to Bayview Hunters Point, though, Task Force 
members in the Imperial Valley note that while involving residents is difficult, it is equally 
challenging to get local agencies to attend IVAN meetings or respond to reports filed through 
IVAN. In fact, Luis Olmedo, the founder of the IVAN network and Executive Director of 
CCDV, did not cite low community participation as being of concern but did note repeatedly the 
importance of boosting the engagement of local agencies. He indicated improvement, however, 
when he explained:  
At the local level, especially in rural areas [government agencies] get no attention and no 
funding. They get no nothing; so people become very bitter … they feel like, ‘You just 
come out here to call me out on things, but you never offer me support and money.’ So I 
think there’s a sense of that. But I think IVAN over time throughout the years, because 
we’ve been very consistent, I think now we see that there’s more willingness at the local 
level [in] Imperial. 
 
Other participants in the Task Force, however, take a less sanguine perspective. A resident told 
me, for example, “[T]he fact that county department heads don't regularly come to EJ Task Force 
meetings probably says something about how they feel. Because for them it's like, a 5- or 10-
minute drive, and yet there are people that come from Sacramento, San Francisco, LA, San 
Diego …  that come to the meeting because they care.” In addition to the challenge of cajoling 
local agencies to participate in meetings, Task Force members find that those agencies remain 
unresponsive to reports filed through IVAN. For example, one Task Force member said, “The 
Air District here is not very responsive. And that’s an agency that we wish … I mean, they’ve 
been to our Task Force meetings before. But that’s an agency that sometimes, we submit reports 
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and we call them directly but they never show up. They’ll say, ‘Oh, we can’t make it. We’re low 
on staff.’”  
Analysis 
 Participation looks different in Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley because 
of the disparities in size and composition of the Task Forces. The IVAN-Imperial Task Force has 
developed an intimacy and group cohesion that the Task Force in Bayview Hunters Point lacks; 
yet, the group in San Francisco has succeeded in securing the consistent participation of a much 
broader array of government agencies than the group in Imperial County has. The tenor of the 
dialogue in San Francisco is more oppositional; there is tension in the room throughout the 
meetings, which is acknowledged by government and community members alike. In the Imperial 
Valley, relationships appear to be stronger and collaboration in the sense of power-sharing feels 
more possible; however, there seems to be no mechanism in place to ensure that the ideas 
generated through collaboration align with the goals of the Task Force or to delegate 
responsibilities to Task Force members when the possibility of collaborative action arises. For 
example, when Hector suggested advocating for the APCD to sign an MOU with CARB, which 
could potentially significantly affect the capacity to enforce mobile emissions-related 
regulations, his suggestion was neither captured in notes nor did any Task Force member offer to 
follow up on it. In both Task Forces, community participation is narrow but deep; relatively few 
community members participate in the Task Force, but those who do are consistent and their 
contributions reflect extensive knowledge garnered both through personal experience with 
environmental health hazards, and through research and interactions with a variety of experts and 
agency personnel.   
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 Concerns about participation point to larger questions about the function of IVAN. Is it 
primarily a reporting network that does not see a large volume of use because of competing 
government reporting systems, or is it mainly an organizing tool that is under-utilized because 
the core participants present at the Task Force meetings have not strategized adequately to 
mobilize the community? Should IVAN function as a platform to express and address existing, 
clearly defined concerns shared by community members, or is IVAN a forum to define and 
refine those concerns with input and support from the community and the additional insight of 
government agencies? Perhaps in part because IVAN is a collaborative program, its participants 
emphasize different facets of its function and thus ascribe varying significance to the challenge 
of low participation. To better understand the value of increasing participation in IVAN and to 
begin to talk about strategies to do so, it will be useful to articulate the range of functions that 
participants associate with IVAN.  
The Functions Of IVAN 
Accountability 
 Luis Olmedo and Bradley Angel, executive directors of CCDV and Greenaction, 
respectively, rank increasing the accountability of government agencies high on the list of the 
roles IVAN plays in their communities. For Angel, accountability is the bottom line: “its essence 
is an accountability forum. And it’s hard to wiggle out of it,” he explained of the Task Force. 
The government agencies, he said, “know controversial stuff comes up and we won’t zip our lips 
on it.” When we met in his office the day before the February IVAN meeting, Angel anticipated 
that the U.S. EPA would, after agreeing to make a presentation on the latest developments at the 
Navy Shipyard, suggest instead that they were open only to answering questions from residents. 
He said, “Marie’s probably going to call ‘em up, and I’m sure there’s going to be people yelling 
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at ‘em. But at least they’re there, and they have taken some more actions … I mean, communities 
will continue to be able to have this direct face-to-face accountability once a month.” Angel 
perceives that the accountability starts with the simple fact that government agencies at every 
level from city to federal show up at every meeting. “So,” he explains, “their presence makes 
them accountable.”  
 Whereas Angel believes that accountability has increased because government agencies 
are showing up for the monthly meetings, Olmedo describes the role of the problem-solver as 
central to imposing accountability on regulatory agencies and other government entities. He 
explains that after the problem-solver routes a complaint to the appropriate agency, “There is an 
expected obligation that the [problem-solver] would do everything in their power to get that 
report to the proper agency and then get feedback or get that agency to the table, so that on a 
month-to-month basis we eventually get to resolve the problem.” In reality, however, the 
problem-solver expressed that not having time built into her work schedule for IVAN makes it 
very challenging to do more than make an initial contact with agencies to inform them about 
reports that fall under their jurisdiction. Olmedo also explained that IVAN’s functionality as a 
reporting tool makes it valuable as an accountability measure: “Let’s say worse comes to worse 
and an agency doesn’t respond,” he says. “We’ve got one report sent to them, no response. Ten 
reports, same result. Thirty reports. Now we’ve got evidence that … I mean, is this agency just 
neglecting their job, neglecting their authority? Abusing their authority? … Does this now merit 
some kind of legal action?” No situation involving an agency refusing to respond to reports 
submitted through IVAN has escalated to the point of a lawsuit, Olmedo noted; instead, the 
problem-solver has worked with agencies to increase their responsiveness.  
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 Residents echo the emphasis on accountability and the uniqueness of the program’s 
ability to capture the attention of and generate responsiveness among regulatory agencies. A San 
Francisco resident who participates in IVAN explained that the program is “holding [regulatory 
agencies] more accountable than they get held in general, and holding them more accountable to 
this particular community that’s been systematically abused.” He continued, “You can actually 
put a face to someone that cares about your problem, and if it’s not dealt with you can discuss it 
with them and see what’s it going to take to turn up the heat to get some action over here? And 
you can’t get that anywhere else.” Another Task Force member, a long-time resident of Bayview 
Hunters Point explained why having so many regulatory agencies in the same room creates 
accountability. He described finger-pointing between the agencies this way: “I get to get ‘em all 
in one room, and ‘Oh, it’s his fault!’ ‘It’s his fault!’ I don’t want to hear this shit. All of you get 
together and let’s solve the damn thing.” Later, explaining the effect that IVAN has had on 
participants, he said, “It’s accountability. Accountability. Don’t try and bullshit me. I understand 
you’re trying to keep a job. But don’t bullshit me.” In Imperial County, too, residents credit 
IVAN with introducing a sense of accountability among at least some regulatory agency 
officials. One participant explained that IVAN is “beginning to let people know ‘we’re 
looking.’” Another explained that the main point of IVAN is to address “this issue of not being 
accountable to us” and that she can tell regulators are paying attention to IVAN because “when 
we submit these reports, we ask for accountability. We ask, okay, what did you do about this? … 
It’s not just submitting the report, it’s what comes after.”  
  The government employees interviewed for this study were less likely than Greenaction 
and CCDV staff and residents to describe accountability as a key function of IVAN’s work. In 
San Francisco, out of the six government participants in interviews, just one described fostering 
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accountability as one of the most important roles IVAN plays. In the Imperial Valley, out of 
three government interviewees, two mentioned accountability, but neither described it as central 
to IVAN’s work. Accountability appears to manifest differently between the two regions, which 
is likely because of the rates of government participation in the two regions. In Bayview Hunters 
Point at the February Task Force meeting, government attendees included representatives from 
one federal, one state, and four local agencies: the U.S. EPA, the California DTSC, The 
Department of Public Works, SFE, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District, and the San 
Francisco Public Utilities Commission. An employee of CARB and a San Francisco Department 
of Public Health employee also frequently attend. In the Imperial Valley, by contrast, there were 
just two state agencies and one federal agency represented at the February meeting: the DTSC-
Imperial CUPA, CARB, and the U.S. EPA. In the past the Regional Water Quality Control 
Board has participated as well. The broad participation in San Francisco allows residents to hold 
government accountable by asking them directly what they have done to address the 
community’s concerns. In Imperial, the problem-solver is the conduit through which 
communication passes from the community to the agencies in whose jurisdictions potential 
violations occur, and her capacity to demand accountability is limited by the voluntary nature of 
her role.  
 The problem-solver in the Imperial Valley said that she thinks IVAN “gives people, other 
agencies, an inclination to find a resolution or to investigate. Because they know that IVAN has 
already seen it and the community can see it. So, they know that this is happening and 
[community members] expect some sort of resolution.” Another government employee and 
founding member of IVAN in the Imperial Valley used stronger language, asserting, “With 
IVAN you have really a disinterested third party now basically sticking their nose into the 
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business to make sure that the issues are being addressed in a transparent manner.” In most cases 
in the Imperial Valley, the problem-solver forwards reports to local entities that do not 
participate in Task Force meetings, such as the County Department of Environmental Health, 
city governments, or APCD. Although both individuals asserted that IVAN increases 
accountability, one of them also noted that “you definitely have a lot of hesitation on the part of 
the local agencies, because they believe that they have existing reporting systems that are 
perfectly capable of handling whatever IVAN can provide.” This hesitation affects whether 
complaints filed through IVAN are resolved. For example, at the January IVAN-Imperial 
meeting, the problem-solver mentioned that she had forwarded a complaint to the County 
Department of Environmental Health but that “they’re not necessarily the best at keeping in 
touch with me.” At the same meeting, a CCDV staff member suggested inviting APCD to the 
next IVAN meeting. The problem-solver then said, skeptically, “I’ll call them personally and 
invite them next month and see what they say,” and the staff member responded, ‘Yeah, let’s do 
that.” The APCD was not present at the meeting the following month when once again the 
agency’s unresponsiveness arose as a topic of discussion in response to an agricultural burning 
report.  
 Finally, while residents and non-profit organizations stressed the value of IVAN as a 
vehicle to hold government agencies accountable, several government participants in San 
Francisco indicated that IVAN could be doing more to foster accountability. All three 
participants who shared this observation are environmental justice staff members with SFE, 
which does not have regulatory authority. One staff member noted that IVAN’s ability to 
increase accountability is tied to its ability to track complaints effectively. This person pointed 
out that it is currently difficult to use the IVAN website to track which complaints have been 
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resolved, which have not, and whose desk a given complaint is currently sitting on. What is 
needed to hold regulatory agency staff accountable, according to this staff member, is a general 
inventory of what has been resolved, what is pending, and how long it has been pending. Two 
other staff members, interviewed together, explained that they initially expected that Greenaction 
would do more at public forums such as the Task Force meetings to push agencies to follow 
through on investigations. As one interviewee puts it, “They bring issues to our attention and 
after that it’s like they step back … There’s no accountability with us, which I would welcome 
… Maybe we could take a tongue-lashing from Greenaction, but right now they’re not really 
doing that.” In Bayview Hunters Point, then, which has a very high rate of government 
participation, at least some government officials feel that simply being face-to-face with 
community members who expect action is not enough to impose accountability. Both a more 
user-friendly complaint tracking system and more pressure from Greenaction, they indicated, 
would do more to hold government agencies accountable. 
 Accountability, although among the most frequently discussed functions of IVAN, 
remains inconsistently defined across participants in the program, both in Imperial and San 
Francisco. In particular, the mechanism by which IVAN demands and attains accountability from 
regulatory agency staff is unclear. For example, although in theory the problem-solver in 
Imperial County is responsible for following up on complaints so that eventually problems are 
resolved, in reality she does not have the capacity to demand follow-through from the parties 
responsible for addressing complaints. She explained:  
[M]y participation in EJ and the role of the problem-solver is strictly voluntary. It’s not 
part of my job description. We have nothing in our Memos of Understanding that relate 
to environmental justice, so everything I do is voluntary … I have zero percent [of my 
time] allotted for this. So I get the email notification, but when I don’t get the email 
notifications, which I haven’t been doing recently, I don’t check IVAN very often.  
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If there is no mechanism by which to guarantee that local agencies are held to account by the 
community, or by the problem-solver who works on their behalf, then there may be a risk that 
despite the sense community members have that they are being heard, the Task Force’s function 
is reduced to something closer to placation than to meaningful participation (Arnstein 1969). 
This lack of clarity is important because, from the perspective of the advocacy organizations that 
sponsor IVAN in the Imperial Valley and Bayview Hunters Point, the ability to insist on 
accountable regulatory agencies is part of what makes productive collaboration possible. 
Building Relationships and Establishing Trust  
 The multi-stakeholder work IVAN is able to do is not made possible solely by reminders 
that the community will hold government accountable. Community members and government in 
both Imperial County and San Francisco described ways in which participating in IVAN has 
built a foundation for personal relationships between community members and government 
employees and established or, in some cases, re-established trust between community and 
government. Meaningful participation of poor and people of color communities in environmental 
decision-making is only possible when existing social relations, in which those communities are 
marginalized, are disrupted. Building relationships and trust among individuals takes time, but 
without it, mistrust and the perception of a lack of respect can hamper productive collaboration 
(Lynn 2000). Residents in both the Imperial Valley and Bayview Hunters Point have expressed 
distrust of government, and in both regions some agencies have been skeptical and distrustful, 
especially early on, of IVAN’s intentions and of the wisdom of involving the public in matters 
related to enforcement. The work of building personal investment among Task Force participants 
was described in interviews as a precondition of building working partnerships between 
government and community.  
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 Historical and recent breaches of trust in both Bayview Hunters Point and in Imperial 
County have left many residents skeptical about the government’s intent to look out for the 
community’s best interests. Currently, the most significant broken relationship in Bayview 
Hunters Point is between residents of the neighborhood and the U.S. Navy. The Hunters Point 
Naval Shipyard was designated a Superfund site and placed on the National Priorities List in 
1989, and the cleanup is led by the Navy with regulatory oversight from the U.S. EPA, DTSC, 
and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (U.S. EPA 2017). In 2011, 
whistleblowers showed that a Navy contractor, Tetra Tech, had falsified soil samples from the 
site, underrepresenting the amount of radioactivity in the soil, and possibly dumping radioactive 
soil illegally. Residents and advocates want comprehensive retesting of the entire shipyard site 
and independent oversight of both the retesting process and the cleanup of illegally dumped 
radioactive soil. As Bradley Angel of Greenaction explained during the February Task Force 
meeting, “The fact is Tetra Tech was caught in 2011. The agencies didn’t take action until 
December 13, 2016. Five years. There is less than no trust … The Navy can say whatever the 
hell they want, or EPA with all due respect, or DTSC, we’re not going to trust it.” This study 
does not explore explicitly how the community’s experience with the Shipyard has affected 
residents’ perceptions of other government agencies, but it seems likely that mistrust toward one 
set of government agencies would cast a shadow over perceptions of others as well. The Task 
Force has allowed participants to begin repairing the relationships between community members 
and government, if not with the Navy specifically. 
 In the Imperial Valley, residents’ concerns about government were directed mostly 
toward agencies at the local level. Because government participation in the Imperial Valley EJ 
Task Force comes mainly from state agencies, there is not as much of a need as in San Francisco 
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to overcome a significant lack of trust rooted in past experiences. In a discussion at the February 
IVAN-Imperial Task Force meeting, one resident said that she would not feel free to speak 
openly if county officials were present at a meeting, indicating her mistrust of local government 
officials. On the other hand, that resident is among the most vocal and outspoken participants 
when state and federal officials are present.  Another resident, Anita, explained that she signed 
up for air quality alerts from the Imperial County APCD, but she does not trust the data from the 
county’s air monitors. On a clear afternoon in January, she showed me the mountain that sits on 
the border, called El Centinela in Mexico and Mount Signal in the U.S. She told me, “When 
you're able to see El Centinela, you know that that's a good day. I don't need an air monitor. And 
they were telling me on the reports that I was getting because I signed up for the website for the 
alerts, every day the air was good! And I would just stand outside and see, ‘no, okay, today 
they're lying.” Neither resident seems to feel that their local government agencies are responsive 
to them or operate with their best interests in mind, yet their trust of state government agencies is 
much greater.  
 In Bayview Hunters Point, residents, more than Greenaction staff or government 
employees, elaborated in their interviews on the value of interpersonal relationships between 
community members and government staff. For instance, one community member explains, “As 
far as the community is concerned [the benefit of the Task Force is] an ability for them to put 
faces to faceless agencies, and to humanize these agencies and to realize that they’re not all just 
blood-sucking bureaucrats that don’t give a damn about anybody.” Another community member 
recalled the meeting that wrapped up just minutes before our interview: “We were developing 
respect and mutually working … you’ve got to talk to people before you can change people’s 
hearts.” He pointed to a state government employee and a community member who were, aside 
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from our interview, the only two people left in the room, and says, “You see, those two are still 
talking.” For this participant, building relationships is not just about humanizing government; it 
is also about ensuring that he is respected and perceived as technically and scientifically 
knowledgeable and capable of understanding complex information. He said, “So yes, they know 
that I’m not just a crazy old black man. I really know what the hell I’m talking about.” For him, 
IVAN functions in part to “break the stereotypes,” of which he says, “it’s going to take time. It 
don’t happen overnight.” Building relationships is, for some, a process of ensuring their 
recognition from those by whom they have been felt ignored in the past. 
 In contrast with San Francisco, in the Imperial Valley all groups – government, non-
profit, and community members – described the value of building personal relationships between 
community and government.  One state government employee explained, “To me, that’s what 
it’s all about: creating relationships with individuals, and then from there you start doing work in 
the community.” For him, building relationships means building trust. “I’ve worked to make 
them feel like they can ask me anything … So, part of working with these groups is gaining their 
confidence. Because … a lot of these communities, they fear government.” He recalled his early 
days in the group, saying, “I wanted to get a feel of the group, but they wanted to get a quicker 
feel of me … I’ve been out to eat with a lot of these people. And I enjoy this.” The problem-
solver in the Imperial Valley expressed a similar degree of dedication saying, “We care about 
[the community members] so much that their concerns become our concerns, and we want to be 
able to help them, to help them see the resolutions that they want or what they think should be 
done.” A CCDV staff member noted the familiar relationships among members of the group, 
saying, “I don’t know if you noticed the atmosphere. We’re all friends, you know?” 
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 The sample size of this study is not large enough to draw broad conclusions about the 
way Task Force members participate; however, it should be noted that the Task Force in the 
Imperial Valley has been meeting for roughly seven years compared to Bayview Hunters Point’s 
year and a half. This difference may account for the greater emphasis on personal relationships in 
the responses of participants in Imperial. In addition, the San Francisco Task Force is much 
larger than Imperial’s, and the difference in size may affect the ease with which relationships 
develop. Finally, in San Francisco the agencies that were skeptical early on nevertheless attended 
meetings, whereas in the Imperial Valley, local agencies have been resistant to IVAN and do not 
regularly attend Task Force meetings. The regulatory agency officials who do attend are the ones 
who are strong supporters of IVAN. This may allow a stronger affinity to emerge among 
participants than in San Francisco, where the Task Force has not existed for as long and where 
agencies that were initially resistant regularly participate.  
 Building relationships and developing trust are clearly important preconditions to 
functional working relationships. In IVAN, several participants described barriers to building 
consistently strong interpersonal relationships within the network. Most significantly, where 
there have been the greatest breaches of trust, the agencies involved by and large do not 
participate in IVAN. In the meetings I attended in the Imperial Valley, a significant amount of 
time was dedicated to discussing complaints that had been sent to the APCD, and, as noted 
previously, participants expressed frustration at multiple meetings about the lack of 
responsiveness APCD had demonstrated when they reported air quality issues. APCD does not 
attend IVAN meetings, and building trust with other agencies does nothing to repair 
relationships with APCD. Similarly, in San Francisco, there is time at each meeting spent 
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discussing the Navy’s cleanup of the Hunters Point Shipyard, but the Navy declines to attend 
IVAN meetings.  
 An additional barrier to building consistently strong relationship is that government 
involvement in IVAN is voluntary, and especially for state government employees who travel 
long distances for Task Force meetings, finding the time to sustain relationships with community 
members can be a challenge. Nevertheless, some state government employees make the effort 
because they value the work IVAN does and want to express their care for the community. One 
state government employee who commutes four hours each way from Los Angeles to the 
monthly IVAN meetings notes that the ten percent of his time allotted each month for 
environmental justice work covers only one leg of the drive, not to mention the meeting itself; 
however, he joins Task Force members at the Denny’s in El Centro each month for dinner after 
the afternoon meetings. For him, “It’s a little bit of a sacrifice.” Nevertheless, he said, “I’m 
willing to do it,” especially, he explained, since he has developed relationships with community 
members. Doing work that involves the meaningful participation of residents in communities 
disproportionately burdened by pollution requires building trust, and while the voluntary efforts 
of particularly committed public servants is admirable, government employees need more time 
allotted for environmental justice to make relationship-building, trust-building work possible on 
a wider basis.  
 If IVAN were widely understood as much as a tool for establishing trusting relationships 
between community and government as it is as a problem-solving forum for concerns about 
environmental protection, perhaps governmental bodies would consider the selection process for 
participation in the Task Force more intentionally. Asked whether he feels there are other people 
who are willing to put in the kind of time he does on a voluntary basis, the government employee 
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described above responded, “I think so. I think there’s a hell of a lot more of us than you would 
[think]. It’s just that we’re not given the opportunity.” He explained that in his agency, when a 
representative to the IVAN Task Force was chosen, “The selection process in most of these 
places is, you over there, we need you to do this. Do you have any interpersonal skills – that’s 
not a question. It’s never a question. You just go out there, and it’s just ‘Oh, you speak Spanish? 
We need you over there.’” Another government participant employed by a different agency 
shared that her preparation to join the Task Force by her department was minimal. It seems that 
methods for choosing IVAN representatives in agencies vary, but given the importance of 
interpersonal relationships within IVAN, all government entities should take care to select 
participants who express interest in and understanding of environmental justice and who have 
strong interpersonal skills.   
 While the first three challenges facing the process of relationship-building – lack of 
agency participation, voluntary government participation, and inconsistent methods to select 
representatives to IVAN – seem to be the responsibility of government to address, one additional 
challenge relates to community members’ communication of pent-up frustration about the 
conditions in their communities. In Bayview Hunters Point, four government employees 
indicated that there has been tension between community members and government during Task 
Force meetings. A DTSC employee, for example, said, “For community members, sometimes 
this is one of the first opportunities they have to voice their frustrations and concerns directly to 
government people, and it's a captive audience, and so it can be a lot of unloading on them. 
That's a challenge.” He went on to note that the unloading of frustrations has occurred every time 
an IVAN program has started in a new region, and that over time “the outrage dies down a little 
bit, and there’s more productive discussion that happens.” In this way, it seems that the stage of 
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venting frustrations might be a necessary step in the process of fostering honest conversation. An 
SFE staff member summed up her observations this way: “People still feel the injustice of being 
burdened to this level, but at the same time I’ve heard community residents express appreciation 
that we’re all there listening.” She added that the general sentiment often seems to be, “I’m mad 
as hell but thanks for coming.” While challenging, accepting the expressions of frustrations from 
community members and continuing to show up and demonstrate a commitment to listen and to 
respond, appear to be vital parts of the development of collaborative relationships capable of 
collectively producing stronger environmental protection in heavily impacted communities. 
The Production of Environmental Protection 
 The following sections detail how IVAN functions to produce environmental protection 
in the communities it serves. Building relationships and trust and demanding accountability from 
government agencies are two sides of the same coin, both essential functions of IVAN. Those 
improved relationships, and the expectation from community members of accountable action, 
support IVAN’s role as a venue for community members to participate meaningfully in 
environmental governance, especially enforcement. IVAN operates as a platform for community 
members to express their concerns, elevates or amplifies many of those concerns, and works as a 
forum for community, government, and sometimes industry to learn from one another and 
collaborate to identify and enact solutions.  
 IVAN was originally founded to address disparities in environmental quality between the 
Imperial Valley and more affluent communities with fewer people of color; the six other sites 
established across the state share the same purpose. In IVAN, recognition and meaningful 
participation are in part ways to facilitate distributive justice, to ensure environmental benefits 
and burdens are shared fairly. So, while one role IVAN plays is to increase the visibility of and 
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validate the concerns of community members. It is also important to consider whether and to 
what extent IVAN affects the pollution burden borne by the communities where it operates. 
Bradley Angel emphasized this dimension of IVAN’s work in Bayview Hunters Point, stating, 
“The benefits are we’re getting results. The community’s getting results … It’s getting results 
around, whether it’s illegal dumping, idling of trucks, better, more rapid responses to air 
violations, to stopping the railroading of the toxic development of the shipyard in its tracks.”  
 When a problem reported through the IVAN online system leads to action, there are 
several possible ways that action can occur. First, just as when reports are filed through agency 
reporting systems, a single agency may investigate a potential violation and, if enforcement is 
merited, may issue a penalty. In some cases, especially in San Francisco, where the rate of 
agency participation is high, the Task Force allows agencies that usually would not collaborate in 
a consistent, ongoing manner, to work together more frequently to address challenges brought to 
their attention through the Task Force. Although usually the solutions reached through IVAN 
require mostly government agency action, sometimes the Task Force itself acts collectively to 
address residents’ concerns. In addition, government agencies sometimes express support for 
community advocacy on an issue that arises in Task Force discussions. Finally, participants in 
the Imperial Valley noted that IVAN sometimes provides opportunities to change government 
policies and programs to better serve environmental justice communities.  
IVAN as a Platform to Express and Refine Concerns 
 Participants in nearly every interview in both regions described how the Task Force 
functions as a forum where community members can voice their concerns and be heard and 
acknowledged. For example, in San Francisco, Roger Kintz of DTSC explained, “what’s unique 
about the Task Force is IVAN brings everybody together to talk about the reports … For 
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community members, sometimes this is one of the first opportunities they have to voice their 
frustrations and concerns to government people.” IVAN offers a space to bring the community 
into direct contact with government agencies, and it also, as a U.S. EPA official noted, allows 
community members to discuss “any environmental issue in the community,” rather than 
addressing one narrow concern as other venues for public participation are more likely to do. 
Because it is an open forum, IVAN can be flexible to meet the needs of residents with a broad 
range of concerns. Bradley Angel of Greenaction, for example, pointed out the importance of 
IVAN’s role as a community forum in the case of the Tetra Tech soil sample falsifications, 
saying, “I think IVAN became the only forum, really, where we were able to discuss it … The 
Task Force became a forum to push stuff.”  
 In Imperial County, too, a DTSC/Imperial CUPA employee stated simply, “the 
community finally has a platform in which they can go to express their concerns about the 
community they live in. I’m not aware of any other platform you have in Imperial County for 
that.” His colleague concurred, saying that one of the greatest benefits of the Task Force is that 
community members “let their concerns be known” and, whereas in other interactions with 
government officials they had not felt heard, “I think here they get the sense [that] we’re here 
and we actually listen.” Ray, a resident on the IVAN-Imperial Task Force corroborated those 
statements, explaining that IVAN “just personifies what I’ve been thinking. It validates what I’ve 
been thinking.” Anita, also a resident from Imperial, said that IVAN “gives some of us the 
opportunity to speak up, to let our voices be heard.” By creating a space where residents who 
historically have not felt listened to can voice their concerns and be heard and taken seriously by 
representatives of government agencies, IVAN offers a measure of recognition justice to 
communities disproportionately burdened by environmental pollution. The sense that this role of 
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being a community forum is a central component of IVAN is shared in both the Imperial Valley 
and Bayview Hunters Point.  
 IVAN is valuable as a forum not only because it allows community members to voice 
their concerns, but also because it provides a space to refine those concerns and figure out how 
they should be addressed. A U.S. EPA official explained, “It’s a good forum for people to bring 
their concerns and then take somewhat of a collaborative approach to figuring out, ‘Okay, well 
what is your actual issue?’ Because … some people, you know, they’re old school, they want to 
just talk about it. So, the group in some instances can help refine what the complaint is and figure 
out, okay, how can we address this.” She noted that for her, this approach is not entirely new, 
because the Superfund division of the U.S. EPA is mandated to do community involvement; 
however, that is not the case in other agencies or even other divisions of the U.S. EPA, so she 
appreciates how IVAN brings community involvement to other government agencies and 
departments. 
Multi-Directional Flow of Information  
 Information-sharing operates in IVAN as a way to demand greater accountability from 
government, to elevate community concerns to the attention of government officials, to enable 
collective action by the Task Force, and to push for change to policies and programs related to 
environmental justice at the local and state levels. The multi-directional flow of information, 
over time, builds more comprehensive, shared understandings among stakeholders, which leads 
to more nuanced, honest, and productive discussion. Participants in both Task Forces described a 
multi-directional flow of information, from community members to government agencies and 
from government to community. In addition, several Task Force members indicated that their 
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own awareness of the severity of environmental injustice has increased because of their 
participation in IVAN.  
 According to a long-time participant in multiple IVAN networks explained, government 
benefits from this information-sharing “by getting community information and community 
intelligence.” This notion of community intelligence surfaced repeatedly in interviews, and the 
term describes the idea that residents function as an extension of the enforcement apparatus, 
reporting potential violations that regulatory agency staff could not catch on their own. For 
instance, as one EPA official said, “It's helpful for the community to be the eyes and ears of the 
IVAN network.” An Environmental Justice Specialist with SFE explained why broad community 
participation in IVAN would be useful, saying, “There might be concerns we haven’t considered 
that people raise. There might be areas where something’s going on and we’re not aware of it.” 
A resident of Imperial County said, “You have to understand that you have these 
agencies…they’re not out there looking for things. But because we live in those communities, we 
are those eyes and those ears, and in terms of the resources, we don’t have to invest extra money 
because we are already there.” On the other hand, Bradley Angel, while asserting that “there’s 
more information flowing” because of IVAN, expressed skepticism as to the degree to which 
government agencies have been previously unaware of the challenges facing community 
members. He noted, “residents share information, although the government knew about all this, 
they just didn’t do anything.” 
 Community members also learn from government agencies at Task Force meetings, both 
through formal presentations about government programs and policies and through the 
participation of government officials in conversations about how complaints are tracked and 
which agencies have jurisdiction over which types of environmental issues. One government 
70 
official who participates in the Bayview Hunters Point Task Force explained that the “open 
forum and discussion” at the meetings allows participants to develop “a better understanding of 
local, state, federal responsibilities. I think anyone who comes to these meetings has a different 
perspective now,” she explained. In Imperial County, too, a staff member at CCDV emphasized 
how the Task Force shifts perspectives: “It’s a great learning place, learning for advocates or 
activists, because you get to learn how government sees things…It’s not just necessarily a place 
for us to say, are you gonna give them violations and enforce? It’s not that. It’s so the community 
can be educated as well, we’re learning what each agency does” (emphasis added). In addition, 
in Imperial County the problem-solver, frequently forwards complaints to agencies that do not 
participate in IVAN and has herself learned more about how enforcement works in different 
local agencies. She told participants at the Task Force meeting in February:  
I do send [reports] to the county. They [used to not] respond to me that much … Before I would 
just send [reports] to whatever inspector I could remember, and one inspector would say, ‘Oh, no, 
it’s not me. It’s the other one,’ and the other one would say, ‘It’s to this one!’ … Now I have a 
more direct path … The way they described it is I send it to their admin staff, their admin staff 
puts it in their database, their director monitors the database, and then it gets sent to the correct 
inspector, because they all do different kinds of jobs. Like this one was sent to their vector 
inspector, and another one was sent to their tire inspector. 
 
This instance illustrates the fact that just as community members learn about navigating 
government bureaucracy through their participation in IVAN, so do government agency staff.  
 While nearly everyone I interviewed described the exchange of information between 
residents and government officials, several also described IVAN’s role in increasing their 
general awareness of the severity environmental justice issues. Of the nine interviewees who 
work in government, two, both in the Imperial Valley, indicated surprise at the depth of the 
pollution problems in the region. One, an employee of the DTSC-Imperial CUPA, explained, “I 
think before [IVAN] I didn’t know this much happened…I’ve seen the ag burns and I’ve seen 
the dumping. But I didn’t know there was as much as I do know now.” Similarly, a CARB Air 
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Pollution Specialist said, “I knew that there were problems, but I didn’t know that they were this 
severe.”  In San Francisco, one resident said, “I was never very aware of environmental justice 
because unless it’s happening to you, you’re generally not aware of it…so it’s increased my 
awareness of that dramatically.” Environmental protection is compartmentalized, and many 
whose day-to-day focus is not environmental justice simply may not be aware before 
participating in IVAN; similarly, for residents who come to the Task Force to address one 
specific issue affecting their lives in mind, IVAN can make them aware that their experiences are 
part of a larger pattern of disproportionate pollution burdens in low-income and people of color 
communities.   
Elevating Concerns 
 One of the key benefits of a forum for residents to have their concerns recognized and for 
varied stakeholders to learn from one another is that such a space increases the likelihood that 
government agencies – whether local, state, regional, or federal, or some combination – will be 
able to respond to the concerns of the community. As Tony (a resident from San Francisco) 
explained, because government agencies have committed to coming month after month to hear 
people talk about the problems in the neighborhood, IVAN has “created an environment where 
there is more likelihood that a solution could be reached and that those problems could be 
addressed, maybe some new ideas might come up or new energy or something.” In addition, 
there is a direct link between the sharing of information (which happens more freely when there 
is trust among participants) and the strength of enforcement cases. Roger Kintz of DTSC noted, 
“The system … provides better quality information-gathering … you get witnesses, photographs, 
statements, that can all be used to build a good enforcement case on the reporting framework of 
IVAN.” So, IVAN both creates an environment where discussion can lead to solutions and offers 
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opportunities for the direct transfer of information from residents to agencies with enforcement 
power.  
 Numerous participants noted that IVAN leads to real outcomes because the forum itself 
elevates community-level, and even individual-level, concerns to the attention of city, state, and 
federal agencies. That both prompts the agencies themselves to act and, at least in one case, has 
put increased pressure on violators to come into compliance with regulations to avoid 
enforcement action. In San Francisco, Tony described the power of elevating concerns about the 
local recycling company. He recalled that “it took hitting them over the head with a two by four 
before they’d sit down and talk to us. Once they saw that it was in their interest to talk to us and 
that we were a force to be reckoned with, then they were smart enough to turn around and say, 
‘Okay, how do we deal with this?’”  
 IVAN has also led to material improvement in environmental quality by addressing diesel 
idling in Bayview Hunters Point. Bradley Angel recalled, “One of the big issues … is diesel 
idling, and there’s never been any government enforcement of those laws. Bayview’s heavily 
impacted by diesel. And so, through Greenaction’s long work on that issue and through the Task 
Force, the Air District and [CARB] stepped up to work with Greenaction, and [said], ‘Okay, 
yeah, we’ll put up some No Idling signs.’” In response to a complaint of diesel idling filed 
through IVAN in June 2016, an Air District employee wrote, “Thank you. This complaint came 
to the Air District well after the fact, and we could not respond. However, the more idling 
complaints we get through IVAN, the more easily we can identify additional areas where idling 
is an ongoing problem. The Air Resources Board and the Air District are working together to get 
the No Idling signs in place at strategic locations.” Agency representatives continued to report on 
progress in developing the signage, and in January 2017 the Air District, CARB, and 
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Greenaction held a press conference announcing the installation of twenty-two anti-idling signs 
in the Bayview neighborhood (Bay Area Air Quality Management District 2017). The locations 
for the signs were determined in collaboration between Marie Harrison, a community organizer 
with Greenaction, and CARB. In this example, IVAN functioned as a tool for the co-production 
of environmental protection, in which community knowledge and regulatory authority 
collaboratively addressed an issue that the community had identified as high-priority. 
 In the Imperial Valley, all participants expressed the idea that one of the key functions of 
IVAN is its role as a forum to elevate the concerns of individuals to agencies that have the power 
to respond. One example was relayed by Roger, a DTSC/Imperial CUPA branch chief, who 
recalled an instance when many residents were concerned about a wind energy project called 
Ocotillo Wind. Members of the Task Force wanted to speak with the North American 
Development Bank (NADBank), which was funding the project, so Roger leveraged his role on a 
government advisory committee on which NADBank also served to bring NADBank into a 
conference call with the Task Force. The purpose of the call was “to try to ensure that NADBank 
understood … where these people were coming from with their concerns.” He admitted, 
“NADBank was very non-committal in their willingness to listen to issues outside their area of 
authority” and hinted at some of his own dissatisfaction with their low level of responsiveness; 
nevertheless, his actions on behalf of residents on the Task Force demonstrate the power of the 
Task Force not just as a forum to air concerns, but also as a mechanism to elevate those concerns 
to decision-makers and regulators with the power to respond.  
 In Imperial County, residents and CCDV staff emphasized the importance of 
participation by state government agencies, explaining that working with the state allows them to 
sidestep the power dynamics operating in the local political arena. Luis Olmedo described the 
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challenges of navigating the “good old boy network that exists in communities like Imperial,” 
explaining that instead of relying heavily on local government participation, “We have more 
faith in the state because they’re less vulnerable to local politics, and they’re not as far-reaching 
as the federal … I think the state is the key ingredient for us.” Humberto, also a CCDV staff 
member, elaborated on the advantages of engaging state agencies rather than local government: 
“Local politics sometimes get in the way … a lot of the county people that are in some of the 
positions are also the same farmer families, so it’s all tied together. That’s why it’s sometimes 
better for us to work with the state agencies. It’s more transparent.” Anita, a resident, told me, 
“You have to understand who is in power here, and power, the economic power, is in the hands 
of just a few here. We have been run by an ag business industry. There is a lot of money 
involved in that … They don’t care about our health.” Anita maintains hope, however, that 
through air monitoring data and ongoing advocacy, the local political culture is starting to 
change, albeit slowly. In Imperial County, the online reporting platform helps bring local 
concerns to the attention of state, regional, and federal agencies, ensuring that the voices of 
residents are heard.   
Inter-agency Collaboration  
 In some cases, bringing concerns to IVAN allows those concerns to be heard by a broad 
spectrum of government agencies at the same time and prompts collaboration among multiple 
agencies. For example, residents from Little Hollywood (just south of Bayview Hunters Point) 
came to the Task Force in 2015 with concerns about problems at Recology, the local recycling 
facility, including noise, traffic, illegal dumping outside the boundary, and vector control. The 
residents had been attempting to engage Recology through letter-writing and media coverage and 
had struggled to gain traction; by bringing their concerns to the attention of IVAN, they were 
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able to get action from government agencies. A U.S. EPA official recalled, “For a long time they 
had been kind of beating down on this company, but I think when the regulators and everybody 
got involved … they kind of listened and they started actually implementing some things that 
helped the community.” Tony Verreos, a resident who organized the effort, recalled, “Through 
IVAN, the different agency people heard the story … and they had four or five different agencies 
send their personnel down to Recology … they went down there with like 15 people, all 
regulators. You know, there isn’t any business around that wants 15 government sets of eyeballs 
running through their business.” Recalling the collaborative effort in response to the Recology 
issue, a staff member with SFE suggested that IVAN can be most effective in cases like that one, 
when the problems reported are complex and “more agencies need to be involved at multiple 
jurisdictions.” She noted that although it is common to see two government agencies pair up 
briefly for an inspection, for example, “getting all of them there together to focus on one issue is 
not as common.”  
 Most online reports do not lead to such a large, coordinated response from agencies; 
however, most interviewees in San Francisco noted that IVAN seems to have increased the 
frequency and regularity of interagency communication. For instance, Lily Lee, the Superfund 
Site Manager for the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, explained, “Sometimes we’ll post [on IVAN 
Online] and say ‘EPA saw this and we’re referring it to [another] agency,’ and then sometimes 
that other agency will say, ‘Yes, I know that this is going on and I’m working on it’ … So one 
change is that we never did this before, and now we do do this.” The posts Lee referred to are all 
visible to the public through the IVAN website. Her comments seem to indicate that 
communication among agencies has increased significantly as a result of the IVAN platform. In 
addition, building relationships through IVAN has allowed government bodies to share 
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information and resources on an ongoing basis. For example, an Environmental Justice 
Coordinator with SFE explained, “I’d say that because of IVAN I feel like I now have a network 
of people to contact when some issue comes up … and we have been able to continue to 
collaborate on different things or refer things to each other.” When illegal dumping arose as a 
significant issue in Bayview Hunters Point, CARB lent SFE a camera to prevent and ideally 
catch violators. Another SFE staff member explained, “That may not have happened had they not 
heard of the need at those meetings. The ability to hear each other’s issues and problems and be 
able to help each other, that has been really good.” 
 Whereas most Bayview Hunters Point interviewees discussed increased interagency 
collaboration as a benefit of IVAN, most interviewees in Imperial did not describe similar 
instances. Notably, although residents and government participants emphasized other benefits, 
Luis Olmedo, the founder of IVAN and Executive Director of CCDV, did discuss collaboration 
among governmental bodies as a benefit of IVAN. In his comments, Olmedo referred to changes 
occurring at the state level in CalEPA. Because of the success IVAN had in developing an 
integrated reporting system, CalEPA remade their online reporting system in the image of 
IVAN’s. Olmedo explained:  
We also see that the CalEPA is now developing a model to get those reports to the 
different agencies internally, which is improving communication … We also see that 
CalEPA is doing these enforcement activities where they’re picking a community and 
going as an interagency enforcement and tackling the issues that are out there by getting 
every department and every expert to go out and address it as a Task Force … now 
you’re taking [a] more comprehensive approach towards environmental protection. 
So, where government participants in San Francisco are seeing greater interagency participation 
among city departments and between city and state bodies, Olmedo perceives a shift in 
CalEPA’s enforcement efforts toward a more coordinated, less compartmentalized approach. 
Olmedo credits IVAN, arguing, “Because of the creation of the pressure of IVAN being a 
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community-based model in some ways being more efficient in trying to do the government’s job, 
government has also tried to step it up.” Indeed, in the press release announcing CalEPA’s new 
integrated reporting system, the agency noted, “CalEPA will continue to update the new system 
and is working closely with IVAN Online, a network of local environmental reporting systems 
that serves more than half a dozen low-income communities across the state, to coordinate the 
functions of the two systems” (CalEPA 2016). While participants did not describe a great deal of 
inter-agency collaboration occurring to solve problems in Imperial County (most likely because 
fewer agencies participate in Imperial County than in San Francisco), Olmedo’s comments 
indicate that IVAN’s efforts have gained the attention of the state environmental agency and 
generated sufficient pressure to improve its reporting system and shift toward interagency 
enforcement.     
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CONCLUSION 
 Residents of Bayview Hunters Point San Francisco juggle concerns about unemployment, 
gentrification and rapidly rising housing costs, radioactive fugitive dust from the Hunters Point 
Naval Shipyard, illegal dumping in streets and alleys throughout the neighborhood, the impact of 
diesel emissions on the lungs of children and the elderly, and the unknown origins and effects of 
the daily assault of strange and pungent odors that drift through the streets. In the Imperial 
Valley, reports to IVAN frequently address smoke from agricultural burning, illegal dumping 
(sometimes of hazardous materials), truck idling, dust from illegal off-road vehicle activity, and 
concerns about pesticide application and possible drift into neighborhoods adjacent to 
agricultural fields. Both sites include several census tracts that score in the top ten percent of 
disadvantaged communities according to California’s environmental justice screening tool, 
which considers a range of factors related to population sensitivities and pollution burden 
(CalEnviroScreen 2017).  
  The Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN) program was founded in 
the Imperial Valley in 2008, and its most recent iteration began operating in 2015 in Bayview 
Hunters Point. Residents in San Francisco participate to address the human health impacts of 
pollution and concerns about quality of life, and to undo the insidious effects of environmental 
racism. In the Imperial Valley, residents see IVAN as a vehicle for change in the community and 
a way to have their concerns heard by state regulatory agencies whose work occurs outside the 
local power dynamic. Multiple participants cautioned me not to make too much of the novelty of 
collaborative approaches to solving environmental justice problems; environmental justice 
advocates have always used a wide array of tools, including collaboration when appropriate, to 
solve problems affecting communities impacted by pollution. What I argue is both novel and 
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unique about IVAN in both locations is its sustained presence over time and its comprehensive 
approach to environmental justice problem-solving, which bring together a variety of 
stakeholders with wide-ranging perspectives on and knowledge. IVAN functions as a forum to 
build trust, increase accountability, educate both government and residents about each other’s 
ways of understanding the impacts of pollution, and generate solutions for environmental 
protection.  
 The development of interpersonal relationships and of trust among community-based 
organizations, government, and residents contributes to recognition justice for the community. 
That means that community members’ accounts of their experiences are met by agency staff with 
respect and with a willingness to take action based on their testimony. Recognition facilitates 
meaningful participation; when residents feel cared for and listened to, they can engage openly 
with government agency staff. In addition, participation occurs on the community’s terms; 
whereas meaningful participation sometimes translates to little more than a seat at the table, in 
IVAN the community has established the structure of the program and sets the agenda each 
month. Government is invited to join a community process each month, rather than the other way 
around. 
 IVAN functions slightly differently in the Imperial Valley than in Bayview Hunters Point 
because the two regions present different political opportunities and challenges. In the Imperial 
Valley, IVAN more nearly approaches the co-production of environmental protection envisioned 
by O’Rourke and Macey (2003), in which regulators work closely with the affected community 
to identify challenges and brainstorm solutions. The relationships among stakeholders are strong, 
and the level of trust among participants is high. The major limitations of IVAN-Imperial appear 
to be a lack of partnering agreements described by Lee (2005) that define the roles and 
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responsibilities of participants and the apparent unwillingness or inability of local agencies to 
participate. Without clear commitments to action from stakeholders, there remains no clear path 
for the ideas generated during meetings, such as inviting APCD to join meetings or applying 
pressure to a local entity to sign an MOU with CARB to enforce mobile source air pollution 
regulations, to translate into action. The social learning discussed by Balazs and Lubell (2014) 
that occurs at the IVAN-Imperial Task Force meetings has the potential to bridge the gap 
between procedural and distributive justice by making significant improvements to enforcement; 
however, the mechanism to use IVAN to hold local agencies accountable to enforcing 
regulations and to enact ideas generated by the Task Force appears to be absent. 
 In Bayview Hunters Point, many government agencies at the local, state, regional, and 
federal level participate consistently. There, the relationships and trust so apparent in the 
Imperial Valley are less well-established, partly because of the contentiousness of pollution 
problems, such as the ongoing cleanup of the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. In Bayview Hunters 
Point, the primary mechanisms that allow IVAN to make substantive changes to environmental 
conditions are accountability and inter-agency collaboration. The process of social learning one 
observes in the Imperial Valley occurs unevenly in Bayview Hunters Point; residents do share 
information with government agencies and vice versa, but the openness of the dialogue remains 
limited by a history of mistrust that persists. IVAN is still new in Bayview Hunters Point, and 
relationships may deepen as the program becomes more established and residents see more 
results. Nevertheless, as in the Imperial Valley, IVAN in Bayview Hunters Point has built on the 
practice of community-based environmental monitoring by introducing consistent, ongoing 
interaction between the state and the community, in which community intelligence guides 
enforcement activity. In addition, the inter-agency collaboration occurring through IVAN-
81 
Imperial mirrors recent shifts in CalEPA’s approach to enforcement in environmental justice 
communities, and early results such as improvements at the Recology facility suggest that the 
approach may lead to a measure of distributive justice in Bayview Hunters Point. The ability of 
this study to draw strong conclusions about whether IVAN successfully bridges the gap from 
procedural and recognition justice to distributive justice is limited, however, because IVAN lacks 
a robust, accessible data set describing the outcomes of reports filed over the years. 
 Although IVAN is a statewide network, its approach appears to vary considerably 
between regions based on on-the-ground political realities. Future research should evaluate the 
function of IVAN in the Central Valley sites of Kings, Kern, and Fresno Counties. Such an 
investigation could help determine the extent to which community-based environmental 
reporting, in collaboration with government agencies, helps connect the dots among recognition 
justice, meaningful participation, and distributive equity. The evidence that emerged in this 
research suggests that the IVAN Task Forces in Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley 
have navigated their unique sets of local circumstances to arrive at distinctive sets of strategies to 
address environmental justice concerns. In addition, participants in IVAN-Imperial raised 
concerns about the ecological and human health impacts of utility-scale renewable energy 
projects on communities in the Imperial Valley. California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard 
continues to rise, pushing the share of renewable energy on the grid ever higher. Future research 
should investigate the recognition, procedural, and distributive dimensions of utility-scale 
renewable energy expansion in California desert communities. The state’s shift toward 
renewable energy should benefit, not harm, its most vulnerable communities; research on the 
subject should amplify the voices of community members where development has been most 
concentrated. 
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 This thesis set out to answer the question of whether and to what degree collaborative 
approaches can contribute to environmental justice. Reviewing the literature, it appeared that 
there were two opposed camps, one arguing that collaboration in environmental justice problem-
solving can allow partners to leverage resources more effectively and better coordinate their 
efforts (Lee 2005; O’Rourke and Macey 2003). The other expressed positions ranging from 
skepticism (Shilling et al. 2009) to hostility toward the notion that viewing the state as a partner 
could further the cause of environmental justice (Benford 2005; Pulido et al. 2016). What 
became clear in interviews for this study was that neither the residents nor the non-profit 
participants in IVAN thought of this program as sufficient to address the full spectrum of 
environmental injustices in their communities. Instead, IVAN works as a tool specifically to 
address quality of life issues that can be solved through targeted enforcement (although in 
Bayview Hunters Point, its purview has expanded since the dissolution of the Remediation 
Advisory Board). In the full scope of their advocacy work, Greenaction, CCDV, and many of the 
residents who attend Task Force meetings can and do move flexibly between embracing state 
agencies as partners and viewing the state as the opponent. Engagement with the state need not 
be an either/or proposition; instead, advocates can partner with the state on issues for which 
collaboration yields results and take an adversarial stance vis à vis the state on systemic issues 
where there may be less common ground. In the context and scope in which IVAN operates, it 
has successfully facilitated recognition and procedural justice; however, the degree to which 
distributive justice is achieved through this collaborative approach remains uncertain.   
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Figure 1. The Imperial Valley 
 
This map shows the location of the Imperial Valley, south of the Salton Sea, just north of the U.S.-Mexico border, 
and east of the Laguna Mountains in eastern San Diego County. (Source: maps.google.com). 
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Figure 2. Bayview Hunters Point 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This map shows the location of the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood in Southeast San Francisco. The yellow 
dots indicate that there have been 99 reports filed in the northern half of the neighborhood and 22 in the southern 
half since the inception of the IVAN program there in 2015. Bayview Hunters Point is by far the smallest 
geographical region served by an IVAN program. (Source: maps.google.com). 
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Figure 3. IVAN Regions 
 
This figure displays the seven regions where IVAN operates and an eighth planned in Sacramento. The 
sites of the two case studies in this research are circled. (Source: IVANonline.org)  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Interview Guide 
 
Introduction 
Thank you so much for taking the time to talk with me today. Today I’d like to ask you some 
questions about your experience with IVAN. In my research, I’m interested in learning about the 
purpose of IVAN, and I have questions about how the participants work together to achieve 
IVAN’s goals. 
My university requires that I go over this informed consent form with you and obtain your 
signature before going ahead with the interview. I can summarize some of the most important 
points, and then you’re welcome to take as much time as you need to read it before signing. 
[Note that participation is voluntary, participants may request that we stop at any time, names 
and other identifying info may be used, but if there is information that is particularly sensitive 
participants can request that I not associate their identity with their comments on that topic, and 
ask if I can audio record].   
Background 
1. To start out, what is your role on the Task Force?  
a. Follow-up: How long have you been involved? 
b. Follow-up: How often do you attend meetings?  
c. Follow-up: What are your responsibilities on the Task Force? 
2. What led you to become involved with IVAN?  
Function 
3. What do you think are the most important roles that IVAN plays?  
a. Probe: Does IVAN serve any additional purpose?  
b. Probe: Ask for examples whenever possible. 
Structure 
4. How does IVAN operate to fulfill those roles?  
c. Follow-up: What are the roles and responsibilities of various participants in the 
task force?  
d. Follow-up: How are roles determined? 
e. Follow-up: When a complaint is filed, what is the process used to address it?  
f. Follow-up: How are decisions made about what complaints or what issues to 
prioritize? (Ask for examples). 
Outcomes of IVAN 
5. What are the most important results of IVAN’s work?  
g. Follow-Up: Are there any other outcomes that you feel are valuable? 
93 
h. Follow-up: In what ways, if any, has IVAN affected environmental enforcement 
in this neighborhood/region? [Ask for examples.] 
i. Follow-Up: In what ways, if any, has IVAN been able to improve environmental 
quality in this neighborhood/region? [Ask for examples.] 
j. Follow-Up: Has IVAN affected the relationships among community advocates for 
environmental justice and government agency staff members? If so, how? 
6. Has your participation in IVAN changed your personally in any way? Why or why not?  
k. Follow-Up: How have you incorporated these new understandings into your 
activism/continued EJ advocacy/work with [your agency]? 
Relationships 
Something that seems to be unique about IVAN is the regular, monthly meetings among so many 
different stakeholders: government agencies, non-profit organizations, and residents. I’m 
interested in learning more about the task force model, so I’d like to ask you a few questions 
about the interactions among participants in the task force. 
 
7. In your experience, what are the benefits of the task force model of having different 
stakeholders come together at the task force meetings?  
l. Probe: Ask for examples of any benefits cited. 
m. Probe: Are there any other benefits? How do residents benefit? How do agency 
staff benefit? How do organizations benefit? 
8. Are there any challenges associated with the collaborative approach the task force takes? 
n. Ask for examples of challenges.  
o. Any other challenges?  
9. How does your experience with the task force compare with other experiences you have 
had with environmental justice advocacy?  
Conclusion 
10. Is there any more information that you would like to share about your experience 
working with IVAN?  
 
